



# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

---

## MBA PROFESSIONAL REPORT

---

### ANALYSIS OF THE 918TH CONTRACTING BATTALION AND 410TH CONTRACTING SUPPORT BRIGADE UTILIZING THE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT MATURITY MODEL

---

December 2015

**By: Zachary G. Valentine  
Gary A. Croston**

**Advisors: Rene G. Rendon  
Matthew Kremer**

*Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited*

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.				
<b>1. AGENCY USE ONLY</b> (Leave blank)		<b>2. REPORT DATE</b> December 2015		<b>3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED</b> MBA professional report
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b> ANALYSIS OF THE 918TH CONTRACTING BATTALION AND 410TH CONTRACTING SUPPORT BRIGADE UTILIZING THE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT MATURITY MODEL			<b>5. FUNDING NUMBERS</b>	
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b> Zachary G. Valentine and Gary A. Croston				
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b>	
<b>9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> N/A			<b>10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER</b>	
<b>11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b> The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. IRB Protocol number NPS.2010-0071-CR05-EP7-A.				
<b>12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited			<b>12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE</b>	
<b>13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)</b>  The purpose of this research is to determine the contract management process maturity level of the 918th Contracting Battalion and 410th Contracting Support Brigade utilizing the Contract Management Maturity Model. The Mission and Installation Contracting Command (MICC) is undergoing a significant change in structure known as MICC 2025. In order to gauge the effectiveness of this plan, this report analyzes those proposed changes. The 918th Contracting Battalion is part of the MICC, while the 410th Contracting Support Brigade is part of the Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC) and not undergoing the same changes.				
<b>14. SUBJECT TERMS</b> Contract Management Maturity Model, CMMM, Army contracting, contract management, 918 <sup>th</sup> Contracting Battalion, 410 <sup>th</sup> Contracting Support Brigade, Expeditionary Contracting Command, ECC, Mission and Installation Contracting Command, MICC			<b>15. NUMBER OF PAGES</b> 89	
			<b>16. PRICE CODE</b>	
<b>17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT</b> Unclassified	<b>18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE</b> Unclassified	<b>19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT</b> Unclassified	<b>20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b> UU	

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

**Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited**

**ANALYSIS OF THE 918TH CONTRACTING BATTALION AND 410TH  
CONTRACTING SUPPORT BRIGADE UTILIZING THE CONTRACT  
MANAGEMENT MATURITY MODEL**

Zachary G. Valentine, Captain, United States Army  
Gary A. Croston, Captain, United States Army

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
December 2015**

Approved by: Rene G. Rendon

Matthew Kremer

Rene G. Rendon  
Academic Associate  
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

# **ANALYSIS OF THE 918TH CONTRACTING BATTALION AND 410TH CONTRACTING SUPPORT BRIGADE UTILIZING THE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT MATURITY MODEL**

## **ABSTRACT**

The purpose of this research is to determine the contract management process maturity level of the 918th Contracting Battalion and 410th Contracting Support Brigade utilizing the Contract Management Maturity Model. The Mission and Installation Contracting Command (MICC) is undergoing a significant change in structure known as MICC 2025. In order to gauge the effectiveness of this plan, this report analyzes those proposed changes. The 918th Contracting Battalion is part of the MICC, while the 410th Contracting Support Brigade is part of the Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC) and not undergoing the same changes.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK



# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>I.</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>BACKGROUND .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>B.</b>	<b>PURPOSE.....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>C.</b>	<b>RESEARCH QUESTIONS .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>D.</b>	<b>METHODOLOGY .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>E.</b>	<b>BENEFITS OF RESEARCH.....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>F.</b>	<b>LIMITATIONS TO RESEARCH.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>G.</b>	<b>SUMMARY .....</b>	<b>5</b>
 <b>II.</b>	 <b>LITERATURE REVIEW .....</b>	 <b>7</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>B.</b>	<b>ORGANIZATIONAL ASSESSMENTS .....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>C.</b>	<b>ASSESSING ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE IN THE DOD.....</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>D.</b>	<b>CAPABILITY MODELS.....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>E.</b>	<b>STATE OF DOD CONTRACT MANAGEMENT.....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>F.</b>	<b>CONTRACT MANAGEMENT MATURITY MODEL .....</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>1.</b>	<b>Key Process Areas.....</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>a.</b>	<i>Procurement Planning.....</i>	<i>16</i>
<b>b.</b>	<i>Solicitation Planning .....</i>	<i>16</i>
<b>c.</b>	<i>Solicitation.....</i>	<i>17</i>
<b>d.</b>	<i>Source Selection .....</i>	<i>17</i>
<b>e.</b>	<i>Contract Administration .....</i>	<i>17</i>
<b>f.</b>	<i>Contract Closeout and Termination.....</i>	<i>17</i>
<b>2.</b>	<b>Maturity Levels .....</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>a.</b>	<i>Level 1: Ad-Hoc .....</i>	<i>18</i>
<b>b.</b>	<i>Level 2: Basic .....</i>	<i>18</i>
<b>c.</b>	<i>Level 3: Structured.....</i>	<i>19</i>
<b>d.</b>	<i>Level 4: Integrated .....</i>	<i>19</i>
<b>e.</b>	<i>Level 5: Optimized.....</i>	<i>19</i>
<b>G.</b>	<b>PAST CMMM ASSESSMENT RESULTS .....</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>H.</b>	<b>SUMMARY .....</b>	<b>21</b>
 <b>III.</b>	 <b>UNITED STATES ARMY CONTRACTING.....</b>	 <b>23</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>B.</b>	<b>STATE OF ARMY CONTRACTING .....</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>1.</b>	<b>Army Contracting Command.....</b>	<b>24</b>

2.	Mission and Installation Contracting Command .....	26
3.	Expeditionary Contracting Command .....	27
4.	Mission and Installation Contracting Command 2025 .....	28
5.	410th Contracting Support Brigade.....	30
6.	918th Contracting Battalion.....	32
C.	SUMMARY .....	34
IV.	ASSESSMENT RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....	35
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	35
B.	SELECTION OF STUDY PARTICIPANTS .....	35
C.	DEPLOYMENT OF THE CMMM SURVEY .....	35
D.	SURVEY RESULTS AT 410TH CSB.....	36
1.	410th CSB Contract Management Process Maturity .....	38
a.	<i>Procurement Planning, Solicitation Planning, Solicitation, Source Selection, Contract Administration, and Contract Closeout .....</i>	<i>38</i>
E.	SURVEY RESULTS AT 918TH CBN .....	39
1.	918th CBN Contract Management Process Maturity .....	41
a.	<i>Procurement Planning, Solicitation Planning, Solicitation, Source Selection, Contract Administration, and Contract Closeout .....</i>	<i>41</i>
F.	RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONTRACT MANAGEMENT PROCESS IMPROVEMENT.....	42
1.	Procurement Planning.....	42
2.	Solicitation Planning.....	43
3.	Solicitation .....	43
4.	Source Selection .....	44
5.	Contract Administration .....	44
6.	Contract Closeout .....	45
G.	SUMMARY .....	45
V.	SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH .....	47
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	47
B.	SUMMARY .....	47
C.	CONCLUSION .....	47
D.	AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH.....	49
	APPENDIX A. DOD STRATEGIC GOAL 5: MEASURES/RESULTS.....	51

<b>APPENDIX B. AIR FORCE CONTRACTING COMPLIANCE INSPECTION CHECKLIST.....</b>	<b>53</b>
<b>LIST OF REFERENCES .....</b>	<b>67</b>
<b>INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .....</b>	<b>71</b>

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	ACC Organization Chart.....	25
Figure 2.	MICC Organization Chart.....	27
Figure 3.	ECC Organization Chart .....	28
Figure 4.	410th CSB Organization Structure .....	31
Figure 5.	918th CBN Organization Structure.....	33
Figure 6.	Contract Management Maturity Model Assessment Results for 410th CSB .....	38
Figure 7.	Contract Management Maturity Model Assessment Results for 918th CBN .....	41

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Contract Actions Per Fiscal Year.....	34
Table 2.	Maturity Level Conversion Table.....	36
Table 3.	410th CSB Response Demographics .....	36
Table 4.	410th CSB Survey Responses for Key Process Areas.....	37
Table 5.	918th CBN Response Demographics.....	39
Table 6.	918th CBN Survey Responses for Key Process Areas .....	40

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK



## **LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

ACC	Army Contracting Command
AFMC	Air Force Material Command
AMCOM	Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command
APG-ACC	Aberdeen Proving Ground–Army Contracting Command
BBP	Better Buying Power
CBN	Contracting Battalion
CCT	Contingency Contracting Team
CMM	Capability Maturity Model
CMMM	Contract Management Maturity Model
CSB	Contracting Support Brigade
DAWIA	Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act
DCMO	Deputy Chief Management Officer
DOD	Department of Defense
DODIG	DOD Inspector General
ECC	Expeditionary Contracting Command
FY	Fiscal Year
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GPC	Government Purchase Card
GS	Government Service
IG	Inspector General
JTF	Joint Task Force
MICC	Mission and Installation Contracting Command
NAVAIR	Naval Air Systems Command
NAVSEA	Naval Sea Systems Command
NAVSUP	Naval Supply Systems Command
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officers
OIP	Organizational Inspection Program
PEO	Program Executive Office
PM	Program Managers
PP MICC/FC	Piñon Canyon Maneuver Site

R2D2	Rapid Response Deployable Detachment
RDECOM	Research, Development, and Engineering Command
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SWOT	Strength, Weakness, Opportunity, Threat
TACOM	Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command
USD(AT&L)	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
USSOUTHCOM	Army South and U.S. Southern Command

## **I. INTRODUCTION**

In this chapter, we provide an overview of the research project. First, we provide background information on the subject, followed by the purpose of this research. Next, we present the research questions to be answered and the methodology used to conduct the research. We then present the benefits and the limitations of the research. To conclude, a summary of the chapter and an overview of the organization of the report are given.

### **A. BACKGROUND**

Department of Defense (DOD) contracting has been an important issue for more than 20 years, according to its placement on the Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) high risks report in 1992 and its continued status in the report as of 2015 (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2015). The increased operational tempo following the events of 9/11 has placed added pressure on the contracting workforce, both deployed and in garrison. The changing operational tempo coupled with the changing fiscal environment has also affected contracting manpower (Gabbert, 2015). Sequestration has resulted in decreased manpower and more frequent workforce turnover, which places a strain on organizational and individual knowledge retention. Individual and organizational knowledge in the form of mature processes is one way to ensure that knowledge is not lost through personnel attrition. The Contract Management Maturity Model (CMMM) developed by Rendon (2003) has been used successfully by many DOD organizations as a way to gauge the maturity of organizational contracting processes, and perhaps more importantly, to identify best practices that can be passed from organization to organization.

This research applies the CMMM to two contracting units within the U.S. Army, the 410th Contracting Support Brigade (CSB) and the 918th Contracting Battalion (CBN). These units were chosen in part by the request of the Mission Installation Contracting Command (MICC) commander in an effort to gauge the progress of a new initiative, MICC 2025. The 918th CBN falls under the MICC and has been identified as

having progressed the furthest in the implementation of MICC 2025. The 410th CSB falls under the Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC) and is not part of the MICC 2025 initiative.

MICC 2025, under implementation since February 2014, includes two primary changes that attempt to streamline the acquisition process throughout the MICC with a smaller workforce, the popular “do more with less” philosophy (Gabbert, 2015). The first change affects structure. Historically, each office under the MICC was a full-service contracting office. Under the plan, the organizational structure is shifting from full-service offices to six “centers” with 26 “satellites” (Gabbert, 2015). This change in structure leads to the second change, the change in function. As stated, not all offices will be full service under MICC 2025. The satellite offices will perform local contracting for amounts less than the simplified acquisition threshold, \$150,000. In essence, they will conduct the more simple contracting functions and pass on the more complex actions to the center to which they are assigned. In this way, the offices and their employees can become more specialized.

## **B. PURPOSE**

The changes under way within the MICC have the potential to produce many best practices that can be used throughout the Army, the DOD, and the federal government as a whole. This research attempts to answer the question of whether the structural and functional changes resulting from MICC 2025 are having an impact on the contracting process maturity of its organizations.

The purpose of this research is to measure the maturity level of contracting processes in the 918th CBN and the 410th CSB by utilizing the CMMM in an effort to compare and contrast the results for each organization. The comparisons can then be used to gauge the potential impact of MICC 2025 and identify process improvement opportunities.

### **C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

The results of the CMMM process assessment identify maturity levels for each organization in terms of the six key contracting process areas and answer the following research questions:

1. What is the contract management process maturity level for the 918th Contracting Battalion in each of the six contract management process areas?
2. What is the contract management process maturity level for the 410th Contracting Support Brigade in each of the six contract management process areas?
3. What opportunities for process improvement are available for the 410th Contracting Support Brigade and the 918th Contracting Battalion based on the CMMM assessment results?
4. Are the MICC 2025 changes being implemented within Army contracting having an impact on contract management process maturity?

### **D. METHODOLOGY**

For this research, we utilized the CMMM to assess the process maturity levels of the two Army contracting organizations. The CMMM by Rendon (2003) involves a 62-question online survey that was deployed to the leadership of each contracting organization. Utilizing an online version of the survey allowed for instant feedback and the ability to track the response rate in real time. The leadership then distributed the survey to the workforce for completion.

We used a purposeful sampling method in which the survey was deployed only to experienced 1102 and military-equivalent contracting professionals. The experience requirements for survey respondents included Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Level II certification in contracting. The survey was designed to be answered by employees who have contracting experience and are knowledgeable with the organization's contract management processes. Employees with less contracting experience and less knowledge of the organization's processes are more likely to respond with "I don't know" answers to survey questions, which can skew the

results and decrease the validity of the assessment. For this reason, the supervisors were asked to deploy the survey to their contracting workforce certified at Level II and above.

We then analyzed the results of the survey to determine the maturity levels of the organizations' contract management processes in the six key process areas. The maturity levels range from Ad-Hoc to Optimized and are explained in detail in Chapter II. The assessment results of the two organizations were then compared to determine whether any consistencies exist. Differences in assessment results between the organizations are then used to gain insight on whether MICC 2025 is indeed having an impact on contract management process maturity. The assessment results of both organizations are also used to identify key process areas that require extra attention and those that are rated as mature and could potentially be studied as best practices to be shared across the Army, the DOD, and the federal government.

#### **E. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH**

The results of this research will initially benefit the 918th CBN and the 410th CSB with the potential to further benefit Army Contracting Command (ACC). The analyzed data will provide windows into each organization's processes as each of the six contracting key process areas are assigned a maturity level. The maturity levels identify which process areas are more capable and could potentially be used as best practices throughout Army higher echelons as well as identify the process areas that are not as capable and could use process improvement.

The assessment results will then be used to compare and contrast the two organizations. The intent is to gauge the effectiveness of the MICC's new MICC 2025 initiative. Data that shows that maturity levels are much higher in the 918th CSB may imply that the changes implemented under MICC 2025 are having a positive impact. Conversely, if the 410th CBN maturity levels prove to be higher, then the data may provide areas that require more focus within the new initiative. In either case, best practices and problem areas will be identified for each organization.

This research provides a baseline of study for MICC 2025. As the name implies, the initiative will not be complete until 2025. This study will provide an initial look at the

impact of change within the MICC. As the MICC progresses toward its goals, additional research may be done to document its improvement or decline. Each additional study of MICC 2025 could also be compared to the many organizations that have already been analyzed using the CMMM. Should MICC 2025 prove to be a success, the data collected through this and additional research will provide key process areas that can be used as other contracting organizations throughout the Army and the DOD transform.

#### **F. LIMITATIONS TO RESEARCH**

The primary limitations of this research are related to the use of a survey to collect data. The research relies heavily on the organizations' chains of command. The survey must be sent to the eligible employees in order to receive usable data, and it is of the utmost importance that the chains of command support participation in the study. Low percentages of participation would have negative consequences to the validity of the study. This research is also dependent on the effort and honesty of its participants. Time constraints, interest, and many other distractors that result from human study can also limit the accuracy of the data.

Finally, while the CMMM process does identify the maturity levels of key process areas in an organization, it does not identify the reasons that process areas are mature or otherwise. It is left to the leaders to discover what their organization does best in their mature areas and what requires improvement in the less mature process areas.

#### **G. SUMMARY**

Innovative and productive change within Army contracting is essential as it changes from years of war to a more garrison environment. Gabbert (2015) has identified this need as he instituted his MICC 2025 plan. Studying, documenting, and conducting research at a time of great change within an organization the size of the MICC provides a great opportunity to gain a wealth of knowledge in lessons learned and best practices. Much can be taken away from this process of change with continued analysis and documentation regardless of the program's success.

This chapter began with a brief introduction and background of the research. We then listed the research questions that we hope to answer along with the purpose of the research. We then presented the organization of this research report, followed by a discussion on the methodology used for the research. Lastly, we identified and discussed the benefits and limitations of the research.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter II provides a literature review on organizational assessments used in government and business, the assessment of performance within the DOD, other uses of capability models, the current state of contract management within the DOD, and a look at the CMMM. In Chapter III, we take a closer look at U.S. Army contracting's mission by laying out its structure down to the units under discussion, and providing an assessment of their current state. In Chapter IV, we provide the CMMM assessment results and provide recommendations for contract management process improvement opportunities. Chapter V concludes with a summary of the research and recommendations for further research.



## **II. LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

Mature organizational processes within DOD contract management agencies are essential in today's fiscally constrained environment. In this chapter, we provide a literature review of material showing the importance of measuring process capability beginning with an overview of organizational assessments in general. We then detail assessment methods within the DOD and provide an assessment of the DOD's current performance regarding contract management. The chapter closes with a discussion of the current use of capability models and an overview of the CMMM.

### **B. ORGANIZATIONAL ASSESSMENTS**

The importance of knowing one's organization cannot be overstated. Organizational assessment is often the catalyst for change (Lakos & Phipps, 2004). Assessment provides data that indicate where managers' attention, resources, and priorities need to be focused (Lakos & Phipps, 2004). This is true whether culture, performance, individuals, or processes are being assessed. In any case, the focus can be placed on elements that the organization, or person, is doing well and those that require improvements. Cultural attributes, performance, or processes that have proven to be successful can then be used as best practices to improve the organization in other areas. As the famous Chinese philosopher Lao Tzu said, "He who knows others is wise; he who knows himself is enlightened" (Clark, 2009, p. 213). This holds true at the organizational level as well.

The importance of organizational assessments and process improvement is no less important in the public sector than it is in the private sector. In the case of the public sector, taxpayers, elected officials, and government employees all have an interest in how well the government is performing (Piotrowski & Ansah, 2010). In the case of the private sector, the interested parties are employees, stockholders, customers, and potential investors. The results of effective assessments can either build or erode trust in the organization. In either case, there is value in the transparency of an organization.

Assessments are a sign that the organization has a desire to identify its weak points and build upon its strengths. A Strength, Weakness, Opportunity, Threat (SWOT) analysis is an example of an assessment that does just that. Regardless of which type of organizational assessment is used, the use of an assessment is beneficial to all interested parties. This section focused on the importance of organization assessments; next, our discussion transitions to the organizational assessments currently used within the DOD.

### **C. ASSESSING ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE IN THE DOD**

The DOD and the Army produce performance-oriented assessments in the form of Organizational Assessment Reports and the Organizational Inspection Program (OIP). This section examines the two main assessment tools that are utilized.

The Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO) was established on October 17, 2008, through a DOD directive as a way to “better synchronize, integrate, and coordinate the business operations of the Department of Defense to ensure optimal alignment in support of the war fighting mission” (Office of the DCMO, n.d., p. 1). The DCMO is directed to conduct an annual organization assessment by Section 4315 of Title 5, United States Code and other policy directives from the secretary of defense (Office of the DCMO, 2014). The output of this directive is the annual *Organizational Assessment Report* for the DOD. This report provides an organizational assessment of “annual performance results, pursuant to DOD’s Annual Performance Plan and other DOD-wide and DOD component-specific performance results” (Office of the DCMO, n.d., p. 1).

One key section within the report that is acquisition related is DOD Strategic Goal 5: “Reform the business and support functions of the defense enterprise” (Office of the DCMO, 2014, p. 19). This section has seven organizational performance measures that aim to “improve acquisition processes from requirements definition to the execution phase, to acquire military-unique and commercial items” (p. 21). The seven key organizational measurements and results utilized in this assessment are described in Appendix A (p. 21). This organizational assessment is most applicable to the present research project as it has specific acquisition and contracting performance measures.

The next type of organizational assessment performed by the Army is the OIP. The governing proponent of this inspection is the Army inspector general. The mission of the inspector general is to be the “eyes, ears, voice, and conscience of the Army across the spectrum of operations and to conduct thorough, objective, and impartial inspections, assessments, and investigations” (U.S. Army, n.d.-c, p. 1). The Army inspector general works with commanders, state adjutants general, program managers, directors, staff principals, inspector generals (IGs), and all Army inspectors to ensure that the OIP is done within the standards set forth in accordance with Army Regulation 1–201 Army Inspection Policy (Headquarters, Department of the Army [HQDA], 2015).

According to Headquarters, Department of the Army (2015) the basic purpose of the inspections is to provide the commander, director, program manager, and other interested parties with feedback so they can make decisions that will improve their organization. The Army OIP follows five basic principles and five basic elements that encompass the inspection. The basic principles include being purposeful, coordinated, focused on feedback, instructive, and diligent in following up with corrective actions taken (HQDA, 2015). Performance measurement, determination of problem severity, determination of underlying causes of the problem, formulating a solution, and finally giving ownership of the person in the best position to solve the problem make up the basic elements of the inspection (HQDA, 2015). The Army OIP is a useful tool for the present research project as it provides an individually tailored inspection for different types of organizations within the Army.

The Air Force uses a specific self-inspection checklist to assess the performance of contracting organizations (see Appendix B). This checklist provides leadership of Air Force contracting organizations a way to measure and assess performance from a standardized checklist. A self-inspection checklist is one way to assess organizational performance; another way to assess organizational performance is the use of capability models to assess organizational capability. This section focused on current organizational assessments used within the DOD; next, our research transitions to the use of capability models for assessing process maturity.

#### **D. CAPABILITY MODELS**

It has become more important than ever for both business and government to develop their core capabilities, given the global nature of the competitive environment. The difficulty lies in assessing which capabilities or processes require improvement, which can be used as a best practice, and which should be cut completely (Forstner, Kamprath, & Röglinger, 2014). Capability models are a way that management can assess their capabilities. The category in which the capabilities are placed is often according to the maturity level of the process, maturity meaning the level of development of the particular capability (Forstner et al., 2014). Such models are frequently used in information technology, and many areas of business such as project and strategic management (Forstner et al., 2014; Jokela, Siponen, Hirasawa, & Earthy, 2006).

The DOD as well as industry recognized a need for process improvement in the realm of software development in 1986 (Paulk, 1993). The Capability Maturity Model (CMM), one of the original such models, was developed as a joint venture between the DOD and Carnegie Mellon University in the form of the Software Engineering Institute as a result of this need (Paulk, 1993). This model is similar to the one being used for this study. The CMM involves a questionnaire that is structured by key process areas that are evaluated according to their maturity level. The results are used to identify process areas that need improvement and those that can be used as building blocks. Paulk (1993) emphasized that while the questionnaire plays a large role in the model, it should not be the primary focus. He said the focus should be placed on the model itself as it provides developmental guidance. Furthermore, Paulk points out that “success that rests solely on the availability of specific individuals provides no basis for long-term productivity and quality improvement throughout an organization” (p. 18). In other words, individuals and their knowledge come and go; organizational progress and success are achieved through quality processes. The focus is on the model, and the model itself is focused on organizational process improvement, not improvement of the individual. This structure allows it to be transferred to any number of fields, to include contract management.

Kaplan and Norton (1992) developed another model, the balanced scorecard, which provides insight into an organization’s progress toward its strategic goals. The

balanced scorecard utilizes a set of performance measures based on the organizations' vision and strategy (Christesen, 2008). The data collected on these performance measurements are analyzed to ensure the organization is keeping pace with its stated goals. The balanced scorecard views the organization from four perspectives: financial/stewardship, customer/stakeholder, internal business process, and organizational capacity (Balanced Scorecard Institute, n.d.). The balanced scorecard has evolved from simply measuring performance. The data collected are often used to shape the strategy of the organization, making it an ever-changing process (Balanced Scorecard Institute, n.d.). The balanced scorecard is used widely in the DOD, and the GAO (2004) recommends its use as a management tool for measuring defense agency performance.

Many examples of capability models are utilized by government and the private sector to include the Capability Maturity Model for software development and program management. The common theme throughout each model is the emphasis on knowing the organization. Without knowing where the organization is excelling or failing, it is almost impossible to improve. Constant improvement is necessary in today's business environment. In the interest of improving Army contract management, the present study uses the CMMM, which builds upon the work of the Capability Maturity Model. The model can be used across the DOD to address problem areas that are discussed further in the next section.

## **E. STATE OF DOD CONTRACT MANAGEMENT**

The DOD obligates over \$300 billion in defense contracts each year through contracting (GAO, 2015). It is easy to recognize the importance of proficiency and efficiency in this arena. The reality is that the DOD as a whole is not performing well, according to the GAO. The functions of contracting and acquisition in DOD were first listed on the GAO's High Risk List in 1992. The functions have remained there in each biennial report since and appear in the recent 2015 report due to deficiencies in managing service contracts, management of the acquisition workforce, and the integration of operational contracting in contingency operations (GAO, 2015). The GAO serves as the "watchdog" of government spending; just as the name implies, it holds the government

accountable for its actions. In the 2015 High Risk List, several areas require attention. Most are applicable to this research and reflect the DOD's current performance needs. For example, the GAO (2015, p. 14) lists four areas requiring improvement in DOD contract management: "(1) the acquisition workforce, (2) contracting techniques and approaches, (3) service acquisitions, and (4) operational contract support."

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics' (USD[AT&L]) Better Buying Power (BBP) provides potential remedies to many of the GAO's recommendations (OUSD[AT&L], n.d.). BBP began in 2010 to serve as a best practices focal point for the DOD (Kendall, 2015). In the BBP initiatives, the USD(AT&L) highlights DOD acquisition areas of special emphasis for the upcoming years and actions required for success. BBP initiatives can be seen as a response to GAO recommendations and are highlighted in this section as well.

The focus area of the acquisition workforce requires improvement in quality as well as quantity of personnel. The USD(AT&L) has set the workforce as a priority in its BBP initiative. Within BBP 2.0, which was released in 2013, the USD(AT&L) listed improving professionalism of the workforce as one of the seven focus areas (Kendall, 2013). Within this focus area, there were the following initiatives aimed at success: "Establish higher standards for key leadership positions, increased professional qualification requirements for all acquisition specialties, increase the recognition and support of excellence in acquisition management, and continuing to increase the cost consciousness of the acquisition workforce-change the culture" (Kendall, 2013, p. 3). The USD(AT&L) continues this theme in BBP 3.0 with the initiative of "improving the professionalism of the acquisition workforce" (Kendall, 2015, p. 2).

Progress has been made in both quality and quantity in the acquisition workforce (GAO, 2015). The GAO High Risk List recognizes that the DOD has increased the size of the workforce by 14,000 in the last six years shows progress in the quantity category, but also recognizes that there is not currently an outlook or strategy for the ideal mix of civilian and military personnel. It also notes that there is no forecast for future strength or established budgeting for that strength. Recognition is also given to the efforts the DOD has placed on assessment of the workforce's critical skills and competencies (GAO,

2015). Overall, the DOD has remedied 27 of 32 statutory reporting requirements with regard to the workforce (GAO, 2015).

Contract techniques and approaches are a high point for the DOD, according to the GAO report. Contracting techniques and approaches are generally defined as the way in which the government acquires a good or service. These methods include the choice of whether to use a fixed-price contract or a cost reimbursement contract, and the actions necessary to ensure maximum competition in industry (GAO, 2015). The BBP initiative is again given credit for the progress made in this area. BBP 2.0 listed the promotion of effective competition and the improvement of tradecraft in acquisition of services as one of its primary initiatives (Kendall, 2013). The progress made through training and various assessments used to identify best practices has resulted in this portion of contract management being taken off of the high-risk list for 2015.

The importance of contracting for services is shown by the fact that contracting constituted 50% of all DOD contracts in 2013 (GAO, 2015). Historically, as shown in the GAO's report, the DOD has not had an integrated strategy or policy to support its contracting of services. The lack of data, both current and historical, makes it difficult to measure either progress or regression. Therefore, the success or failure of newly implemented policies and procedures cannot be accurately determined. The data that are missing include inventories of all contracted services and inventory of contractor personnel (GAO, 2015). The impact that this has on effective decision-making is evident. The lack of knowledge about the number of personnel, military or civilian, who manage service contracts, as well as not knowing the number of contracts that require managing results, is a strategic nightmare.

Perhaps as a result of the GAO's report, both BBP 2.0 and 3.0 include improving the tradecraft in acquisition of services as a primary initiative. The USD(AT&L)'s guidance is to improve the management of these contracts by including those outside the normal acquisition field (Kendall, 2015). Increased demand for services is at the base level where many services are outside the expertise and view of the actual contracting professional and therefore require expertise and oversight from subject matter experts. For example, a contracting officer could not effectively produce a statement of work for

the requirement of a nursing assistant. The writing of the statement of work requires coordination between contracting personnel and the subject matter experts to ensure proper requirements definition. The subject matter experts often require some additional training to familiarize themselves with the acquisition process. The initiative is to have units and installation offices take a more active role in the acquisition of services. A common level of knowledge is required between program managers, contracting officers, customers, and the contracting officer representatives assigned to monitor the contract. In BBP 2.0, there is a focus on the assignment of senior management to the acquisition of services (Kendall, 2013). This effort addresses the need for better management of data and personnel. Another major focus area of BBP 2.0 is the measurement of productivity and prevention of requirements creep, which refers to the overlap of similar contract requirements that create monetary waste through redundancy (Kendall, 2013).

Lastly, the GAO report recommends the integration of operational contract support. The need for entire military departments to become integrated into operational contracting has become evident in the past 15 years of war. The GAO calls for all departments to include contract support into their contingency planning. As of 2015, only the Army has complied. Neither BBP 2.0 nor 3.0 address this problem directly, but improvements in other initiatives will no doubt have a positive impact on operational contract support.

DOD acquisition has shown improvement but remains on the GAO's high-risk report. The importance of acquisition and contracting in the DOD has been brought to the forefront in this time of war, and new strategies are required to take advantage of lessons learned. The GAO (2015) provided the following recommendations in its report to

- continue to improve contract management by managing the size and training of the workforce.
- determine the correct mix of the workforce with regard to military, civilian, and contractor.
- strategically manage the acquisition of services by utilizing goals and measures, and using data to monitor progress.



- continue the effort of operational contract integration through policy, planning, training, and resource management for current and future operations (pp. 287–292.).

The recommendations show the historical emphasis placed on size and training of the workforce as well as the lack of emphasis placed on developing and managing key processes. The DOD inspector general (DODIG) listed process improvement as a recommendation in many of its reports. In its March 2015 report on contingency contracting, process improvement was recommended in contract administration, source selection, and contract pricing (Department of Defense Inspector General [DODIG], 2015a). Its February 2015 report on contracting controls at Fort Polk drew similar conclusions as processes lack the maturity to be effective in the realm of contract award and administration (DODIG, 2015b). The emphasis that the GAO places on an action plan for services contracting and contract management also highlights the importance of not only a more educated acquisition workforce, but also more mature processes (GAO, 2015). One method of measuring contract management process capability is the CMMM, which is discussed next.

## **F. CONTRACT MANAGEMENT MATURITY MODEL**

This research applies the CMMM to two Army contracting organizations. Rendon (2003) developed the CMMM as “a systematic approach to assessing and improving the capability maturity level of an organization’s contract management processes” (Rendon, 2003, p. 1). This model was developed by Rendon after extensive research into previous models such as CMM, which focused primarily on the project management maturity models. Since project management and contract management are closely related, this provided a good starting point for developing his model. The CMMM assigns a maturity level from 1 through 5 to each of the key process areas in the contract management process. Thus, the CMMM provides both buying and selling organizations a way to measure and improve their contract management processes (Garrett & Rendon, 2005b).

The CMMM has been applied successfully to Air Force and Navy contracting organizations in past research projects such as Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) (Graham, Lewis, & Wallace, 2010) and Air Force Material Command’s (AFMC) Air

Logistics Center (ALC) (Burton & Nordin, 2007). The CMMM has been applied most recently to the following Army contracting organizations: Aberdeen Proving Ground–Army Contracting Command (APG-ACC; Gary & Petree, 2014); Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM; Rendon, 2011); and the Research, Development, and Engineering Command (RDECOM) contracting centers (Rendon, 2011). This research builds upon the existing contract management process maturity body of knowledge. The contract management key process areas and maturity levels are summarized as follows.

## **1. Key Process Areas**

Contract management as a part of any project requires close management. Improvement requires the categorization of the process steps into simplified units for evaluation, in this case, key process areas (Garrett, 2007). Rendon’s CMMM has the contract management process broken down into the six key process areas whose maturity will be measured for the two organizations. The six key process areas are subsequently detailed along with key activities related to the process.

### ***a. Procurement Planning***

Procurement planning involves the decision making process that determines whether a good or service will be provided “in-house” or whether it will be contracted to an outside entity. Rendon (2011) broke this process down further into the following activities: conducting a make or buy decision, specifying the requirements, conducting market research, developing necessary documents to define the work to be done or made, defining budgetary resources and estimates, planning for type of contract to be used, and assessing contract risk.

### ***b. Solicitation Planning***

Solicitation planning is the process of specifying what exactly is needed by the organization and will be provided for by the contractor. This is documented in the statement of work. According to Rendon (2011), another key activity is determining the procurement method, such as sealed bidding or negotiated contracting. Other key activities include developing evaluation criteria and contract award strategy, developing

the solicitation documents, and determining contract type (Rendon, 2011). Lastly, solicitation planning should finalize the description of the product or service to be contracted (Rendon, 2011).

***c. Solicitation***

Solicitation is the process of posting the specific requirement so that contractors can submit their offers. The key activities include advertisement of the procurement, conducting optional proposal conferences, and compilation of a list of qualified bidders (Rendon, 2011).

***d. Source Selection***

Source selection is simply the selection of which contractor will perform the work. Offers are evaluated according to predetermined selection criteria, both parties negotiate the terms and conditions, and the contract is awarded. The key activities in this phase include evaluation of proposals, supplier negotiation, and award of contract (Rendon, 2011).

***e. Contract Administration***

Contract administration occurs as the contract as being carried out. During contract administration, the contractor's work is evaluated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract. The key activities include conducting a pre-performance conference with the contractor, evaluating and measuring the contractor's performance and results, and managing the contract changes process (Rendon, 2011).

***f. Contract Closeout and Termination***

Contract closeout and termination are conducted after the work has been completed or when a contract is terminated. Final payments and legal issues are settled prior to the final closeout of the contract and performance is evaluated and documented. The key activities include disposition of government property, final acceptance of the good or service, final payment, and documenting the contractor's performance during the contract (Rendon, 2011).

Effective contract management hinges on the completion of the key processes and their associated activities. Success can be attributed to a variety of best practices. Rendon's (2003) CMMM listed the key process best practice areas as Process Strength, Successful Outcomes, Management Support, Process Integration, and Process Measurement. The maturity level of an organization's processes is based on how well and how much these best practices are utilized in performing the key processes and activities. The resulting maturity levels are discussed next.

## **2. Maturity Levels**

The CMMM consists of five levels of maturity. Level 1 is the lowest maturity level and Level 5 is the highest maturity level. The different levels of maturity are based on best practices within contract management and represent the nature of an organization's process capability maturity (Garrett & Rendon, 2005a). It is important to note that each level of maturity does build upon the previous level incrementally. The following explains each level of maturity from Ad-Hoc to mature.

### ***a. Level 1: Ad-Hoc***

The Ad-Hoc level of maturity represents the lowest maturity level in the CMMM. At this level, the organization may understand that best practices in contract management processes exist, but the problem lies in their implementation and day-to-day use (Rendon, 2008). At this level of maturity, an organization would also lack any sort of formalized, written standard operating procedure (SOP) for its processes (Rendon, 2008). Processes may be used day to day, but not with any structure or regularity. Without formalized processes, senior management is not held accountable for the organization's complicities with any contract management standards or processes (Rendon, 2008).

### ***b. Level 2: Basic***

The Basic level of maturity represents the second lowest maturity level in the CMMM. At this level of maturity, the organization only has some basic contract management processes and standards in place, but may reserve the enforcement of their use to high visibility contracts (Garrett & Rendon, 2005b). The processes and standards

that exist within the organization are not recognized as being integrated into all functions. (Rendon, 2008). Additionally, the organization does not have policies in place that require personnel to use the basic contract management processes and standards that are in place at the Basic maturity level (Garrett & Rendon, 2005b).

***c. Level 3: Structured***

The Structured level of maturity represents the middle level of maturity in the CMMM. At this maturity level contract management processes are “fully established, institutionalized, and mandated throughout the organization” (Rendon, 2008, p. 7). Checklists and SOPs are used by the organization as a way of formally documenting their contract management processes and standards (Rendon, 2008). Those at the senior management level play an active role “in providing guidance, direction, and approval of key contracting strategy, decisions, documents, and contract terms and conditions” (Rendon, 2015a, p. 19). Lastly, internal controls are in place to enforce the use of contract management processes and standards (Rendon, 2008).

***d. Level 4: Integrated***

The Integrated level of maturity represents the second highest level of maturity in the CMMM. Integration at this level implies that the contracting processes are “fully integrated with other organizational core processes such as financial management, schedule management, performance management, and systems engineering” (Garrett & Rendon, 2005b, p. 3). This integration goes even further to often include the customer for whom they are procuring (Garrett & Rendon, 2005b). The organization has gone beyond just having standards in place; they now have performance and efficiency metrics in place to make contract-related decisions (Rendon, 2008). Lastly, senior management understands its role and performs it well within the procurement process (Rendon, 2008).

***e. Level 5: Optimized***

The Optimized level of maturity represents the highest level of maturity in the CMMM, and one that all organizations should strive to achieve. At this level, all contract management processes are in place, and are periodically evaluated using “efficiency and

effectiveness” metrics and compared with new industry best practices (Garrett & Rendon, 2005b, p. 4). The organization routinely uses lessons learned, best practices, and self-evaluation to improve its contract management processes and standards (Garrett & Rendon, 2005b). This level of maturity represents the most mature type of organization in which senior management and employees are involved in a continuous cycle of learning and change in an effort to constantly improve the contract management process (Garrett & Rendon, 2005b).

#### **G. PAST CMMM ASSESSMENT RESULTS**

The CMMM has previously been used to assess the contract management process maturity within the DOD. The CMMM has been applied most recently to the following Army contracting organizations: APG-ACC (Gary & Petree, 2014), TACOM (Rendon, 2011), the RDECOM contracting centers (Rendon, 2011), and the Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM; Rendon, 2009).

The results from those CMMM assessments showed that all organizations had a Basic maturity level in post-award contract management key process areas of contract administration and contract closeout, while all organizations had a higher maturity level in pre-award contract management key process areas of procurement planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, and source selection. These results from Army contracting organizations are similar to the results from recent Navy CMMM assessment results from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), and Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP; Rendon, 2015b). The Navy results also show higher maturity levels in pre-award contract management key process areas and lower maturity levels in post-award contract management key process areas. These results correspond to multiple DODIG and GAO reports which state contracting agencies do not adequately monitor and assess contractor performance (DODIG, 2014), that additional oversight and management of contracting techniques and approaches is needed (GAO, 2015), and that contracting agencies do a poor job of closing out contracts on time (GAO, 2012).

## **H. SUMMARY**

This chapter provides a literature review of organizational assessments, which are used in both the private and public sectors to measure a variety of functions. In this chapter, we also present details of the ways in which the DOD is assessed, as well as a current assessment of the DOD's contract management performance. Lastly, we detail the key components of the CMMM, which is the model for our thesis research. In the next chapter, we provide insight into the U.S. Army Contracting structure and background information on the two offices inside the MICC and ECC that we chose for our research.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK



### **III. UNITED STATES ARMY CONTRACTING**

#### **A. INTRODUCTION**

In this chapter, we discuss Army contracting and set the stage for the research we performed. Next, we review the organizational structure of Army contracting and the changes to that organization under the MICC 2025 plan. We then describe the organizations where we conduct our research: the 410th Contracting Support Brigade (CSB) and 918th Contracting Battalion (CBN). Lastly, we discuss the specific missions and contract types managed by each organization.

#### **B. STATE OF ARMY CONTRACTING**

The current state of Army contracting receives a mixed assessment. On the one hand, the Army contracted for nearly \$75 billion of goods and services in fiscal year (FY) 2014 (U.S. Army, 2015c). On the other hand, what type of investment are taxpayers receiving on that money? The Army has many of the same issues that are listed in the GAO reports regarding the DOD in the field of acquisition and contracting to include the acquisition workforce and contracting techniques and approaches (GAO, 2015). For the purpose of this report, we address only additional issues that are specific to Army contracting authorities.

Expeditionary contracting operations are the subject of many of the Army's contracting issues. The Secretary of the Army established an independent commission in 2007 to specifically investigate issues and provide recommendations within Army acquisition and program management in expeditionary operations (Gansler, 2007). The commission found five major issues in Army expeditionary contracting and described them as follows:

- The expeditionary environment requires more trained and experienced military officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs). Yet only 3 percent of Army contracting personnel are active duty military and there are no longer any Army contracting career General Officer positions.
- The Army's acquisition workforce is not adequately staffed, trained, structured, or empowered to meet the needs of the 21st century deployed

warfighters. Only 56 percent of the military officers and 53 percent of civilians in the contracting career field are certified for their current positions.

- Notwithstanding a seven-fold workload increase and greater complexity of contracting, the Institutional Army is not supporting this key capability.
- Notwithstanding there being almost as many contractor personnel in the Kuwait/Iraq/Afghanistan Theater as there are U.S. military, the Operational Army does not yet recognize the impact of contracting and contractors in expeditionary operations on mission success.
- What should be a core competence—contracting (from requirements definition, through contract management, to contract closeout)—is treated as an operational and institutional side issue. (Gansler, 2007, p. 2)

These issues have been addressed in part by a completely restructured contracting organization within the Army.


### **1. Army Contracting Command**

The Army Contracting Command (ACC) was established on October 1, 2008, in response to the independent commission (“ACC History,” n.d.). The ACC was designed to be a new, unique Army organization that performs the majority of contracting support within the Army (“ACC History,” n.d.). Within the ACC, the Army established the Mission and Installation Contracting Command (MICC) and the Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC) as major subordinate commands (“ACC History,” n.d.). The ACC, MICC, and ECC are the main organizations that currently provide contracting support for goods and services for the Army. In some cases, other organizations may provide contract support, but for the purposes of this study, only the three aforementioned organizations are notable.

The ACC is a two-star command that oversees all Army contracting activities (U.S. Army, 2015c). The ACC is a subordinate command of the Army Materiel Command (AMC) and is headquartered at Redstone Arsenal, AL. The mission of the ACC is to provide global contracting support to the Army and its Soldiers (U.S. Army, 2015c). As seen in Figure 1 the ACC has five major contracting centers that primarily provide contracting support to the Army’s major Program Executive Offices (PEO) and

Program Managers (PM) which support the major acquisition programs (U.S. Army, 2015c). These ACC offices executed more than 170,000 contracts in FY 2014 valued in excess of \$50 billion (U.S. Army, 2015c). The ACC employs over 6,000 military and civilian personnel to support those contract actions worldwide (U.S. Army, 2015c).

Figure 1. ACC Organization Chart




Source: U.S. Army. (n.d.-b). Command and staff. Retrieved June 14, 2015, from <http://acc.army.mil/command-and-staff/>

## **2. Mission and Installation Contracting Command**

The MICC performs major contract actions for the Army and is one of two major subordinate commands under the ACC. The mission of the MICC is to provide “Army commands, installations, and activities with disciplined and responsive contracting solutions and oversight” (U.S. Army, 2015b, p. 1). The MICC headquarters is located at Joint Base San Antonio–Fort Sam Houston, TX. The MICC is composed of nearly 1,600 military and civilian contract professionals (U.S. Army, 2015b). Those members are “assigned to three contracting support brigades, one field directorate office, and 33 field offices that provide contracting support across the Army” (see Figure 2 for MICC organization; U.S. Army, 2015b, p. 1). The MICC is primarily responsible for acquiring equipment, supplies, and services at the installation level (U.S. Army, 2015b). In addition, the MICC is responsible for the management of the Government Purchase Card (GPC) program, which is the way in which the Army makes the majority of its micro purchases. In total, the MICC was responsible for 37,000 contract actions valued at over \$5.6 billion, and 633,000 GPC program transactions valued at \$783 million in FY 2014 alone (U.S. Army, 2015b).

Figure 2. MICC Organization Chart




Source: A. Armstrong. (2012, February 26). *Presentation to the Base Business Initiative (BBI) test companies, partner companies, and public* [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from <http://www.howardcountymd.gov/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id= 6442465088>

### 3. Expeditionary Contracting Command

The second subordinate command of the ACC is the ECC. The ECC's mission is to provide contracting support for Army operations outside the United States (U.S. Army, 2015a). The ECC headquarters is located at Redstone Arsenal, AL. The organization accomplishes its mission by employing 1,800 military and civilian contract professionals who are assigned to nine contracting support brigades, 17 contracting battalions, and 108 contracting teams worldwide (see Figure 3 for ECC organization; U.S. Army, 2015a). The ECC is primarily responsible for goods and services in direct support of full spectrum military operations during contingency operations. The ECC currently supports 180 expeditionary missions in 52 different countries, which resulted in 29,000 contract actions valued at more than \$1.75 billion in FY 2014 (U.S. Army, 2015a).

Figure 3. ECC Organization Chart



Source: U.S. Army. (n.d.-a). About ECC. Retrieved June 14, 2015, from <http://acc.army.mil/ecc/about/>

#### 4. Mission and Installation Contracting Command 2025

As part of this research, it is important to note the ongoing change within the MICC organization. MICC 2025 is a change of organization structure and responsibilities in an effort to produce personnel cost savings, increase competition with contracts, and improve personnel turnover rates (Gabbert, 2015). This plan is centered around three major organizational shifts to produce those outcomes: the organization of six main

contracting centers and 26 satellite offices, the reorganization between contract specialists (GS-1102) and purchasing agents (GS-1105), and change of contracting responsibilities among the center offices (Gabbert, 2015).

The MICC was previously organized into small, medium, and large offices based on historical workload. With the MICC 2025 plan, there would only be six full service contracting offices: Joint Base Langley-Eustis, VA; Fort Knox, KY; Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA; Joint Base San Antonio–Fort Sam Houston, TX; Fort Hood, TX; and Fort Bragg, NC (Gabbert, 2015). These offices would provide all contracting support to the satellite offices for procurements over \$150,000 per action or \$5,500,000 for commercial items. The remaining 26 offices would be considered satellite offices that only handle simple procurements under \$150,000 per action or \$5,500,000 for commercial items (Gabbert, 2015).

Changing the organization structure and responsibilities of each office forced the third major change: the reorganization of contract specialists and purchasing agents. In the old MICC structure, contract specialists were involved in much of the workload on contract actions less than \$150,000 (Gabbert, 2015). Those actions, however, were typically simple and did not require the expertise of a contract specialist. The result was higher overhead rates than what would be expected for simple contract actions (Gabbert, 2015). MICC 2025 addresses this concern by shifting all simple actions under the previously discussed threshold to satellite offices, thereby eliminating the need for so many contract specialists. MICC 2025 would convert 250 contract specialist positions to purchasing agents to address the new responsibilities of satellite offices (Gabbert, 2015). The end benefits result in an immediate savings of \$11,100,000 a year and potential future savings of \$17,900,000 per year (Gabbert, 2015). These savings are mostly due to the difference in pay between contract specialists (GS-11) and purchasing agents (GS-7).

The procedural and structural changes related to MICC 2025 result in more specialization at each of the six main contracting centers and 26 satellite offices. The six main contracting centers will be able to specialize in larger procurements as their focus will be on larger, more complex contracts—such as new facility construction—within their regions. This high level of specification can lead to a higher process maturity due to

the repetition of similar contract actions. The same can be stated for the 26 satellite offices that specialize in smaller, less complex procurements, such as janitorial services or grounds maintenance, which can lead to higher maturity of their processes due to the high repetition of those actions.


## **5. 410th Contracting Support Brigade**

The 410th CSB is a subordinate command of the ECC; its mission is to provide “contracting support to Army South and U.S. Southern Command in support of Army and Joint Operations in the U.S. Southern Command area of operations” (Harger, 2015, p. 5). Its headquarters is located at Fort Sam Houston, TX. This office was selected for the study because its structure is similar to MICC organization prior to MICC 2025 changes. This will assist our research assessing the maturity of contract management processes at each type of organization for comparison purposes.

The 410th CSB has a typical top-down hierarchical structure similar to most military organizations and other CSBs within the ECC. The 410th CSB has five regional contracting offices and one contingency contracting battalion under its command, which can be seen in Figure 4 (Harger, 2015). Most of the work in the CSB is performed by contract specialists and purchasing agents resulting in an extremely bottom-heavy personnel load. The 410th CSB currently comprises 100 military and civilian contracting personnel who help service its customers’ needs (J. S. Ortiz, personal communication, August 13, 2015). The 410th CSB and ECC organizations are unique in their ability to perform rapid deployment operations (Harger, 2015). The 410th CSB has a 40 Soldier Rapid Response Deployable Detachment (R2D2) ready to deploy within 72 hours in support of a Joint Task Force (JTF; Harger, 2015). Additionally, the 410th CSB maintains a pool of two deployable Contingency Contracting Teams (CCTs) that can deploy in support of any USSOUTHCOM contingency operation (Harger, 2015).



Figure 4. 410th CSB Organization Structure



Source: Harger, D. (2015). *410th contracting support brigade command brief* [Unpublished presentation slides].


A brief overview of the 410th CSB customers and current operations shows a diverse customer and mission base. Its primary mission is to support contingency and expeditionary operations in USSOUTHCOM area of operations. Its customer base includes 7th Special Operations Group, foreign partnered governments, United States Navy, and many other agencies (Harger, 2015). The 410th CSB also supports worldwide operations to include Operation Fuerzas Commando (Columbia), Operation Fused Response (Belize), Operation Fuerzas Humanitarias (El Salvador), and several other key forward operations (Harger, 2015). It supported 5,200 personnel, obligated \$6.4 million, and executed 170 contract actions in support of mission operations in FY 2014 alone (Harger, 2015). The 410th CSBs' mission load is much smaller in terms of the number of contract actions and dollars obligated than an MICC organization, but it supports a wider range of contracting activities.

## **6. 918th Contracting Battalion**

The 918th CBN is a subordinate command of 418th CSB, and both commands are subordinate to the one-star command of the overarching MICC. The 918th CBN's mission is to provide contract support for goods and services to units assigned to Fort Carson and units utilizing the Piñon Canyon Maneuver site (PP MICC/FC; McFall, 2015). The 418th CBN office is considered a satellite office under MICC 2025, and its headquarters is located at Fort Carson, CO. It was chosen as one of the offices to apply the CMMM because it is the furthest along in the MICC 2025 plan, and likely to have the most mature contracting process within the MICC.

The 918th CBN is organized into a top-down hierarchy as seen in Figure 5. This structure is typical in the MICC 2025 format where individual teams are separated into two divisions: the mission contracting division and installation contracting division. The mission contracting division generally supports mission requirements such as aircraft maintenance, communications equipment and services, and small purchases using government purchase cards. The installation contracting division generally provides base contracting support for organizations such as Directorate of Public Works and the Logistics Readiness Center for items such as elevator maintenance, commissary repurposing, and information technology support services. This organization format includes an extremely bottom-heavy personnel load much like the 410th CSB, as most of the work is accomplished by contract specialists and purchasing agents. The 918th CBN currently comprises 28 uniformed service members and 22 civilian contracting personnel who support its daily contracting operations.


Figure 5. 918th CBN Organization Structure



Source: McFall, T. (2015). *918th CBN/MICC-FC organizational overview* [Unpublished presentation slides].

A brief overview of the 918th CBN customers and current operations shows a diverse customer and mission base. The 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson Garrison Headquarters, 10th Special Forces Group, 4th Combat Aviation Brigade, and the 71st Ordnance Group are a few of the major customers served by the 918th (McFall, 2015). The 918th CBN also supports worldwide operations to include Operation Atlantic Resolve (Ukraine), Operation Observant Compass (Uganda), Special Operations Command Central, several National Training Center rotations (Fort Irwin), and several other key forward operations (McFall, 2015). As with most Army contracting organizations, the 918th CBN has seen a steady decrease in contract actions due to the current budget constraints and the drawdown in contingency operations worldwide. Its customers and missions have resulted in nearly 3,800 contract actions since FY 2012 (see Table 1). Its diverse mission and heavy contract load makes the 918th CBN a good candidate organization for assessment using the CMMM.

Table 1. Contract Actions Per Fiscal Year



Source: McFall, T. (2015). *918th CBN/MICC-FC organizational overview* [Unpublished presentation slides].

## C. SUMMARY

In this chapter, we discussed the state of Army contracting and the Gansler commission. We then explained the organization of the ACC and its two subordinate major commands of the ECC and MICC. Next, we analyzed the MICC 2025 plan and the changes that it has sought to implement within the MICC to address current contracting challenges. Lastly, we gave a brief history, mission, and organization structure of both the 918th CBN and 410th CSB, the organizations involved in our research. The next chapter addresses the CMMM assessment results and our process improvement recommendations.

## **IV. ASSESSMENT RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

This chapter provides the results from the CMMM assessment conducted at the 410th CSB and the 918th CBN. First, we discuss the selection of the study participants and the administration of the CMMM survey. Next, we analyze the survey responses and assign a maturity level to each key process area for both organizations based on the survey results. We then provide an analysis of each contract management key process area for both organizations. Lastly, we provide recommendations for process improvement opportunities for both organizations.

### **B. SELECTION OF STUDY PARTICIPANTS**

This research used a purposeful sampling method in which the CMMM survey was deployed only to DAWIA Level II and Level III certified 1102s and military equivalents who are directly involved in their organization's contracting processes. Level II and III certified respondents possess the knowledge and experience necessary to provide valid answers to the survey questions. Respondents with less experience in contract management, and therefore in their organization's contract management processes, are less likely to have the insight necessary to accurately answer the CMMM survey questions. Despite our efforts, it was found that the survey was deployed to and answered by several less experienced Level I personnel. Those responses were deleted from the analysis to maintain the validity of the research. Selection of study participants was the first step in the deployment of the survey, which is covered in the next section.

### **C. DEPLOYMENT OF THE CMMM SURVEY**

The CMMM survey was deployed electronically to the 410th CSB and 918th CBN in August 2015 and remained opened for 19 days. The volunteers were asked to answer a 62-question survey that assessed the contract management process capability at their organization. The responses were compiled and analyzed following the survey's

closure. Then a process maturity level was calculated for each contract management key process area using the conversion table listed in Table 2.

Table 2. Maturity Level Conversion Table

10 Question Conversion Table (50 points)	
0-24	Ad-Hoc
25-36	Basic
37-42	Structured
43-46	Integrated
47-50	Optimized
11 Question Conversion Table (55 points)	
0-27	Ad-Hoc
28-40	Basic
41-46	Structured
47-51	Integrated
52-55	Optimized

#### D. SURVEY RESULTS AT 410TH CSB

There were a total of 53 eligible survey participants within the 410th CSB. There were 21 total responses, which provide an overall response rate of 40%. Table 3 provides a further breakdown of the demographic data from each organization to include response rates, number of warranted respondents, level of DAWIA certification, and years of experience.

Table 3. 410th CSB Response Demographics

Total Eligible	Completed Surveys	Response Rate	Warranted	DAWIA Level II	DAWIA Level III	Years of Experience
53	21	40%	11	4	17	$\leq 3 = 1$ 4 to 8 = 8 9 to 13 = 5 14 to 18 = 2 $\geq 18 = 5$

Table 4 provides the mean scores and standard deviations from the survey responses for each contract management key process area. The mean scores were applied to Table 2 for a contract management process maturity level determination.

Table 4. 410th CSB Survey Responses for Key Process Areas

410th CSB							
Key Process/Item Number/Description				Key Process/Item Number/Description			
Question Number	Key Process Area	Mean	Standard Deviation	Question Number	Key Process Area	Mean	Standard Deviation
1.1	Procurement Planning	3.81	1.63	2.1	Solicitation Planning	4.10	1.34
1.2	Procurement Planning	3.57	1.75	2.2	Solicitation Planning	3.48	1.63
1.3	Procurement Planning	3.43	1.57	2.3	Solicitation Planning	3.86	1.35
1.4	Procurement Planning	3.29	1.49	2.4	Solicitation Planning	3.95	1.12
1.5	Procurement Planning	3.71	1.49	2.5	Solicitation Planning	3.71	1.19
1.6	Procurement Planning	3.43	1.54	2.6	Solicitation Planning	3.43	1.50
1.7	Procurement Planning	3.14	1.56	2.7	Solicitation Planning	3.14	1.59
1.8	Procurement Planning	3.29	1.55	2.8	Solicitation Planning	3.43	1.08
1.9	Procurement Planning	3.10	1.84	2.9	Solicitation Planning	3.10	1.84
1.10	Procurement Planning	3.33	1.62	2.10	Solicitation Planning	3.48	1.36
Mean Total		34.10		Mean Total		35.67	
Question Number	Key Process Area	Mean	Standard Deviation	Question Number	Key Process Area	Mean	Standard Deviation
3.1	Solicitation	3.40	1.64	4.1	Source Selection	3.80	1.44
3.2	Solicitation	3.20	1.77	4.2	Source Selection	3.35	1.84
3.3	Solicitation	3.55	1.61	4.3	Source Selection	3.50	1.85
3.4	Solicitation	3.40	1.47	4.4	Source Selection	3.85	1.50
3.5	Solicitation	3.50	1.54	4.5	Source Selection	3.90	1.29
3.6	Solicitation	3.15	1.50	4.6	Source Selection	3.60	1.57
3.7	Solicitation	3.05	1.54	4.7	Source Selection	4.10	1.25
3.8	Solicitation	3.10	1.41	4.8	Source Selection	3.75	1.45
3.9	Solicitation	2.80	1.77	4.9	Source Selection	3.45	1.39
3.10	Solicitation	3.10	1.59	4.10	Source Selection	3.05	1.90
Mean Total		32.25		4.11	Source Selection	3.55	1.36
Question Number	Key Process Area	Mean	Standard Deviation	Question Number	Key Process Area	Mean	Standard Deviation
5.1	Contract Administration	3.80	1.36	6.1	Contract Closeout	3.60	1.50
5.2	Contract Administration	3.85	1.39	6.2	Contract Closeout	3.20	1.61
5.3	Contract Administration	3.90	1.37	6.3	Contract Closeout	3.35	1.35
5.4	Contract Administration	3.50	1.54	6.4	Contract Closeout	3.80	1.51
5.5	Contract Administration	3.65	1.31	6.5	Contract Closeout	2.80	1.74
5.6	Contract Administration	3.85	1.31	6.6	Contract Closeout	3.00	1.45
5.7	Contract Administration	3.10	1.65	6.7	Contract Closeout	3.20	1.54
5.8	Contract Administration	3.35	1.46	6.8	Contract Closeout	2.80	1.77
5.9	Contract Administration	2.10	1.97	6.9	Contract Closeout	3.45	1.43
5.10	Contract Administration	3.30	1.72	6.10	Contract Closeout	2.60	1.79
5.11	Contract Administration	3.45	1.43	Mean Total		31.80	
Mean Total		37.85					

## 1. 410th CSB Contract Management Process Maturity

The resulting contract management process maturity level for the 410th CSB can be seen in Figure 6. The maturity level for all contract management key process areas is Basic. Further analysis of these findings is detailed in the following section.

Figure 6. Contract Management Maturity Model Assessment Results for 410th CSB

CONTRACT MANAGEMENT MATURITY MODEL®						
MATURITY LEVEL	PROCUREMENT PLANNING	SOLICITATION PLANNING	SOLICITATION	SOURCE SELECTION	CONTRACT ADMIN	CONTRACT CLOSEOUT
5 OPTIMIZED						
4 INTEGRATED						
3 STRUCTURED						
2 BASIC	410	410	410	410	410	410
1 AD HOC						

410<sup>th</sup> CSB n=21

### a. *Procurement Planning, Solicitation Planning, Solicitation, Source Selection, Contract Administration, and Contract Closeout*

The 410th CSB's contract management process areas of procurement planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, source selection, contract administration, and contract closeout were found to be at the Basic level of maturity. At this level of maturity, the organization only has some basic contract management processes and standards in place, but may reserve the enforcement of their use to high visibility contracts (Garrett &



Rendon, 2005b). The processes and standards that exist within the organization are not recognized as being integrated into all functions (Rendon, 2008). Additionally, the organization does not have policies in place that require personnel to use the basic contract management processes and standards that are in place at the Basic maturity level (Garrett & Rendon, 2005b). It should be noted that the mean score totals for the key process area of source selection is at the high end of the Basic maturity level and very near the Structured maturity level.

#### **E. SURVEY RESULTS AT 918TH CBN**

There were a total of 26 eligible survey participants within the 918th CBN. There were 14 total responses, which provide an overall response rate of 54%. Table 5 provides a further breakdown of the demographic data from each organization to include response rates, number of warranted respondents, level of DAWIA certification, and years of experience.

Table 5. 918th CBN Response Demographics

Total Eligible	Completed Surveys	Response Rate	Warranted	DAWIA Level II	DAWIA Level III	Years of Experience
26	14	54%	9	4	10	$\leq 3 = 2$ 4 to 8 = 7 9 to 13 = 1 14 to 18 = 1 $\geq 18 = 3$

Table 6 provides the mean scores and standard deviations from the survey responses for each contract management key process area. The mean scores were applied to Table 2 for a contract management process maturity level determination.

Table 6. 918th CBN Survey Responses for Key Process Areas

918th CBN							
Key Process/Item Number/Description				Key Process/Item Number/Description			
Question Number	Key Process Area	Mean	Standard Deviation	Question Number	Key Process Area	Mean	Standard Deviation
1.1	Procurement Planning	3.71	1.59	2.1	Solicitation Planning	4.29	1.27
1.2	Procurement Planning	3.50	1.56	2.2	Solicitation Planning	3.57	1.87
1.3	Procurement Planning	3.29	1.64	2.3	Solicitation Planning	3.57	1.45
1.4	Procurement Planning	3.21	1.25	2.4	Solicitation Planning	3.79	1.37
1.5	Procurement Planning	3.86	1.29	2.5	Solicitation Planning	3.71	1.27
1.6	Procurement Planning	3.71	1.49	2.6	Solicitation Planning	3.50	1.61
1.7	Procurement Planning	3.57	1.22	2.7	Solicitation Planning	3.64	1.39
1.8	Procurement Planning	3.29	1.64	2.8	Solicitation Planning	3.14	1.79
1.9	Procurement Planning	3.07	1.73	2.9	Solicitation Planning	3.07	1.86
1.10	Procurement Planning	2.86	1.51	2.10	Solicitation Planning	3.36	1.60
Mean Total		34.07		Mean Total		35.64	
Question Number	Key Process Area	Mean	Standard Deviation	Question Number	Key Process Area	Mean	Standard Deviation
3.1	Solicitation	3.43	1.34	4.1	Source Selection	3.92	1.44
3.2	Solicitation	2.79	1.72	4.2	Source Selection	3.25	1.76
3.3	Solicitation	3.00	1.57	4.3	Source Selection	3.25	1.82
3.4	Solicitation	3.43	1.34	4.4	Source Selection	4.08	1.44
3.5	Solicitation	3.57	1.60	4.5	Source Selection	4.00	1.48
3.6	Solicitation	3.21	1.81	4.6	Source Selection	3.92	1.44
3.7	Solicitation	3.29	1.77	4.7	Source Selection	4.08	1.38
3.8	Solicitation	3.14	1.41	4.8	Source Selection	3.75	1.86
3.9	Solicitation	3.00	1.71	4.9	Source Selection	3.58	1.83
3.10	Solicitation	3.14	1.35	4.10	Source Selection	3.08	1.83
Mean Total		32.00		4.11	Source Selection	3.17	1.80
Question Number	Key Process Area	Mean	Standard Deviation	Question Number	Key Process Area	Mean	Standard Deviation
5.1	Contract Administration	3.75	1.14	6.1	Contract Closeout	4.00	0.95
5.2	Contract Administration	3.67	1.07	6.2	Contract Closeout	3.75	1.14
5.3	Contract Administration	3.58	1.00	6.3	Contract Closeout	3.92	0.90
5.4	Contract Administration	3.67	0.78	6.4	Contract Closeout	4.33	0.89
5.5	Contract Administration	3.50	1.68	6.5	Contract Closeout	3.58	1.78
5.6	Contract Administration	3.67	1.61	6.6	Contract Closeout	3.42	1.56
5.7	Contract Administration	3.67	1.37	6.7	Contract Closeout	3.75	1.14
5.8	Contract Administration	3.17	1.53	6.8	Contract Closeout	3.33	1.61
5.9	Contract Administration	2.33	2.06	6.9	Contract Closeout	3.33	1.56
5.10	Contract Administration	3.08	1.83	6.10	Contract Closeout	2.83	1.99
5.11	Contract Administration	2.92	1.51	Mean Total		36.25	
Mean Total		37.00					

## 1. 918th CBN Contract Management Process Maturity

The resulting contract management process maturity level for the 918th CBN can be seen in Figure 7. The maturity level for all contract management key process areas is Basic. Further analysis of these findings is detailed in the following section.

Figure 7. Contract Management Maturity Model Assessment Results for 918th CBN

CONTRACT MANAGEMENT MATURITY MODEL®						
MATURITY LEVEL	PROCUREMENT PLANNING	SOLICITATION PLANNING	SOLICITATION	SOURCE SELECTION	CONTRACT ADMIN	CONTRACT CLOSEOUT
5 OPTIMIZED						
4 INTEGRATED						
3 STRUCTURED						
2 BASIC	918	918	918	918	918	918
1 AD HOC						

918<sup>th</sup> CB n=14

### a. *Procurement Planning, Solicitation Planning, Solicitation, Source Selection, Contract Administration, and Contract Closeout*

The 918th CBN's contract management key process areas of procurement planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, source selection, contract administration, and contract closeout were also found to be at the Basic level of maturity. At this level of maturity, the organization only has some basic contract management processes and standards in place, but may reserve the enforcement of their use to high visibility

contracts (Garrett & Rendon, 2005b). The processes and standards that exist within the organization are not recognized as being integrated into all functions. (Rendon, 2008). Additionally, the organization does not have policies in place that require personnel to use the basic contract management processes and standards that are in place at the Basic maturity level (Garrett & Rendon, 2005b). It should be noted that the mean score totals for the key process areas of source selection and contract closeout are at the high end of the Basic maturity level and very near the Structured maturity level.

## **F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONTRACT MANAGEMENT PROCESS IMPROVEMENT**

This section evaluates the maturity levels assigned from the CMMM survey results and provides recommendations for improvement in each contract management key process area. Given that the maturity levels were the same for every process area across both organizations, the recommendations are also the same across organizations.

### **1. Procurement Planning**

Procurement planning was assessed as being at the Basic level for both the 918th CBN and the 410th CSB. In order to improve the maturity level of both organizations, the contract management processes involving procurement planning must be fully institutionalized, established, and mandated rather than being used only on special cases (Rendon, 2015a). Not only should documentation be developed to support the procedures and processes, but some of the processes could be automated (Rendon, 2015a). The tailoring of processes and documents should be permitted to accommodate unique contracts (Rendon, 2015a). According to Rendon, “senior management should be involved in providing guidance, direction, and even approval of key contracting strategy, decisions, documents and terms and conditions” (Rendon, 2015a, p. 19). These processes include key activities such as conducting requirements analysis and definition, market research, developing a preliminary budget, schedule, and work statement, and preliminary consideration of procurement method and contract type (Rendon, 2015a).

## **2. Solicitation Planning**

Solicitation planning was assessed as being at the Basic level for both the 918th CBN and the 410th CSB. In order to improve the maturity level of both organizations, the contract management processes involving solicitation planning must be fully institutionalized, established, and mandated rather than being used only on special cases (Rendon, 2015a). Not only should documentation be developed to support the procedures and processes, but some of the processes could be automated (Rendon, 2015a). The tailoring of processes and documents should be permitted to accommodate unique contracts (Rendon, 2015a). According to Rendon, “senior management should be involved in providing guidance, direction, and even approval of key contracting strategy, decisions, documents and terms and conditions” (Rendon, 2015a, p. 19). These processes include key activities such as preparation of the solicitation document, documentation of program requirements, and identification of potential sources (Rendon, 2015a). Determination of contract type, procurement method, evaluation criteria and contract award strategy are also part of solicitation planning as the terms and conditions are structured and the work statement is finalized (Rendon, 2015a).

## **3. Solicitation**

Solicitation was assessed as being at the Basic level for both the 918th CBN and the 410th CSB. In order to improve the maturity level of both organizations, the contract management processes involving solicitation must be fully institutionalized, established, and mandated rather than being used only on special cases (Rendon, 2015a). Not only should documentation be developed to support the procedures and processes, but some of the processes could be automated (Rendon, 2015a). The tailoring of processes and documents should be permitted to accommodate unique contracts (Rendon, 2015a). According to Rendon, “senior management should be involved in providing guidance, direction, and even approval of key contracting strategy, decisions, documents and terms and conditions” (Rendon, 2015a, p. 19). These processes include key activities such as conducting solicitation conferences, site visits, advertising the procurement opportunity, and maintaining a qualified offerors list (Rendon, 2015a).

#### **4. Source Selection**

Source selection was assessed as being at the Basic level for both the 918th CBN and the 410th CSB. In order to improve the maturity level of both organizations, the contract management processes involving source selection must be fully institutionalized, established, and mandated rather than being used only on special cases (Rendon, 2015a). Not only should documentation be developed to support the procedures and processes, but some of the processes could be automated (Rendon, 2015a). The tailoring of processes and documents should be permitted to accommodate unique contracts (Rendon, 2015a). According to Rendon, “senior management should be involved in providing guidance, direction, and even approval of key contracting strategy, decisions, documents and terms and conditions” (Rendon, 2015a, p. 19). These processes include key activities such as receiving and evaluating proposals, conducting negotiations, awarding the contract, and documenting the contract agreement (Rendon, 2015a).

#### **5. Contract Administration**

Contract administration was assessed as being at the Basic level for both the 918th CBN and the 410th CSB. In order to improve the maturity level of both organizations, the contract management processes involving contract administration must be fully institutionalized, established, and mandated rather than being used only on special cases (Rendon, 2015a). Not only should documentation be developed to support the procedures and processes, but some of the processes could be automated (Rendon, 2015a). The tailoring of processes and documents should be permitted to accommodate unique contracts (Rendon, 2015a). According to Rendon, “senior management should be involved in providing guidance, direction, and even approval of key contracting strategy, decisions, documents and terms and conditions” (Rendon, 2015a, p. 19). These processes include key activities such as conducting a pre-performance conference, performing contractor surveillance, monitoring and measuring contractor performance, processing contractor payments, and managing changes to the contract (Rendon, 2015a).

## **6. Contract Closeout**

Contract closeout was assessed as being at the Basic level for both the 918th CBN and the 410th CSB. In order to improve the maturity level of both organizations, the contract management processes involving contract closeout must be fully institutionalized, established, and mandated rather than being used only on special cases (Rendon, 2015a). Not only should documentation be developed to support the procedures and processes, but some of the processes could be automated (Rendon, 2015a). The tailoring of processes and documents should be permitted to accommodate unique contracts (Rendon, 2015a). According to Rendon, “senior management should be involved in providing guidance, direction, and even approval of key contracting strategy, decisions, documents and terms and conditions” (Rendon, 2015a, p. 19). These processes include key activities such as conducting the final acceptance of the supplies or service, which leads to processing the final payment to the contractor (Rendon, 2015a). Conducting property disposition, documenting contractor performance and lessons learned are also performed during contract closeout (Rendon, 2015a).

## **G. SUMMARY**

This chapter provided the results from the CMMM assessment conducted at the 410th CSB and the 918th CBN. Analysis of each contract management process area was conducted for both organizations. We then assigned specific maturity levels to each key process area for both organizations, and finally provided opportunities for process improvement for both organizations. In the next chapter, we provide a summary and conclusion of our research, and identify recommendations for further research.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK



## **V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

In this chapter, we summarize our research, discuss our conclusions by answering our research questions, and identify recommendations for further research.

### **B. SUMMARY**

DOD contracting has been a hot button issue for over 20 years, as shown by its placement on the GAO's *High Risk List* each year since 1992 (GAO, 2015). The increased operational tempo, a changing fiscal environment, and sequestration have only added pressure on the acquisition workforce. The addition of employee turnover to the existing pressure can cause a loss of knowledge within the workforce. The typical responses to the issues identified by the GAO are additional training for the acquisition workforce and additional acquisition personnel (GAO, 2015). However, what is missing in the DOD's response is a focus on contract management process capability. Improving organizational contract management processes is another way to address the ongoing issues in DOD contracting. The Contract Management Maturity Model (CMMM) is a way to measure the maturity of organizations' contracting processes.

The purpose of this research was to assess the maturity level of the contract management key process areas at the 918th CBN and the 410th CSB using the CMMM. The CMMM results provided us with a way to assess the process maturity of each contract management key process areas and provide recommendations for improvement. Next, we provide answers to our research questions based on the results of the CMMM survey and identify recommendations for further research.

### **C. CONCLUSION**

The conclusions of this research are provided by answering our research questions:

**1. What is the contract management process maturity level for the 918th Contracting Battalion in each of the six contract management process areas?**

The results of the CMMM, as shown in Figure 7 of Chapter IV, show that all of the contract management key process areas for the 918th CBN are functioning at a Basic maturity level. The 918th CBN should focus its resources on steadily improving all of the contract management key process areas to the next higher maturity level of Structured.

**2. What is the contract maturity level for the 410th Contracting Support Brigade in each of the six contract management process areas?**

The results of the CMMM, as shown in Figure 6 of Chapter IV, show that all of the contract management key process areas for the 410th CSB are functioning at a Basic maturity level. The 410th CSB should focus its resources on steadily improving all of the contract management key process areas to the next higher maturity level of Structured.

**3. What opportunities for process improvement are available for the 410th Contracting Support Brigade and the 918th Contracting Battalion based on the CMMM assessment results?**

The assessment results indicate both the 410th CSB and the 918th CBN have much room for improvement in the process maturity of their contract management key process areas. They should focus key resources on improving all of the contracting management key process areas by developing contract management processes and standards throughout their organization, providing formal documentation for these key processes and standards, and ensuring internal controls are in place to enforce these contract management processes and standards. By focusing key resources on implementing the previously mentioned recommendations, both organizations have the ability to attain the next higher maturity level of Structured in all of the contract management key process areas.

**4. Are the MICC 2025 changes being implemented within Army contracting having an impact on contract management process maturity?**

The results of the CMMM assessment show that neither organization has more mature contract management processes than the other. This indicates three possibilities: that the changes in MICC 2025 have not had enough time to take effect, that the CMMM

survey was not the most effective way to measure the changes resulting from MICC 2025, or that MICC 2025 does not impact the contract management key process areas maturity level. Our conclusion, based on our research and CMMM results, is that given more time, the changes implemented in MICC 2025 should improve the process maturity of the contract management key process areas.

#### **D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH**

We recommend the three following areas for additional research. First, conduct the CMMM assessment for the entire Army Contracting Command (ACC). This type of assessment would not only be valuable in assessing the process maturity of the contract management key process areas, but provide valuable insight into the MICC 2025 changes. Second, compare and evaluate research results from other ACCs' CMMM results in order to implement best practices and information sharing. This would help create an environment of constant improvement and would be extremely valuable in improving all contracting organizations within the Army. Lastly, perform a follow-up assessment using the CMMM at both the 918th CBN and 410th CSB at a future time when both MICC 2025 changes and CMMM recommendations have been fully implemented. Additional assessments should be scheduled by both organizations' leadership so that the organizations can monitor and track the progress of the maturity level of their contract management key processes. This allows both organizations' leadership to strive for a continuous cycle of learning and improvement, a key component of the Optimized maturity level.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## APPENDIX A. DOD STRATEGIC GOAL 5: MEASURES/RESULTS

DoD STRATEGIC GOAL 5: REFORM THE BUSINESS AND SUPPORT FUNCTIONS OF THE DEFENSE ENTERPRISE				
DoD Strategic Objective 5.3-2E: <i>Improve acquisition processes, from requirements definition to the execution phase, to acquire military-unique and commercial items.</i>				
Key Performance Measures	Strategic Plan Long-Term Performance Goals	Annual Performance Goals/Results		
		FY 2012 Results	FY 2013 Q3 Goals	FY 2013 Q3 Results
*5.3.1-2E: Percentage of contract obligations that are competitively awarded. (USD(AT&L))	5.3.1-2E: Beginning in FY 2012, the DoD will increase, by one percent annually, the amount of contract obligations that are competitively awarded.	57.5%	58%	■ 55.8%
*5.3.2-2E: Average percent increase from the Approved Program Baseline (APB) cycle time for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) starting in FY 2002 and after. (USD(AT&L))	5.3.2-2E: Beginning in FY 2011, the DoD will not increase by more than five percent from the Approved Program Baseline (APB) cycle time for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) starting in FY 2002 and after.	6.61%	5%	■ 5.15%
5.3.4-2E: Number of Major Automated Information System (MAIS) "significant" breaches (equal to or greater than 15 percent of Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) total cost or with schedule slippages greater than six months). (DCMO)	5.3.4-2E: Beginning in FY 2011, the DoD will ensure that the number of MAIS "significant" breaches (equal to or greater than 15 percent of the APB total cost or with schedule slippages greater than six months) will not exceed one.	1	1	■ 1
5.3.5-2E: Number of Major Automated Information System (MAIS) "critical" breaches (equal to or greater than 25 percent of Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) total cost or with schedule slippages of one year or more) (DCMO)	5.3.5-2E: By FY 2012, the DoD will ensure that the number of MAIS "critical" breaches (equal to or greater than 25 percent of the APB total cost or with schedule slippages greater than one year) will not exceed two.	0	2	■ 2
5.3.6-2E: Average rate of acquisition cost growth from the previous year for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) starting in FY 2002 (USD(AT&L))	5.3.6-2E: Beginning in FY 2012, the DoD will ensure that average rate of acquisition cost growth from the previous year for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) starting in FY 2002 does not exceed three percent.	-0.27%	3%	■ -1.64%
*5.3.7-2E: Number of Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) breaches (equal to or greater than 15 percent of current Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) unit cost or equal or greater than 30 percent of original APB unit cost) for reasons other than approved changes in quantity. (USD(AT&L))	5.3.7-2E: Beginning in FY 2012, the DoD will not have any MDAP breaches (significant cost overruns) for reasons other than approved changes in quantity.	1	0	■ 0
5.3.9-2E: Cumulative percent of Major Defense Acquisition Programs certified, as required by the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (USD(AT&L))	5.3.9-2E: By FY 2013, 100 percent of Major Defense Acquisition Programs will be certified, as required by the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009	84%	92%	■ 88%

Source: Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer [DCMO]. (2014). *Organizational assessment report*. Retrieved from <http://dcmo.defense.gov/publications/documents/Organizational%20Assessment%20FY14.pdf>

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## APPENDIX B. AIR FORCE CONTRACTING COMPLIANCE INSPECTION CHECKLIST

**Air Force Contracting Compliance Inspection Checklist**

TIER	ITEM #	ITEM	REFERENCE	RESULT (Yes, No, N/A)
		<b>Contract File Content</b>		
		<b>General Contracting</b>		
	<b>1.1</b>	<b>Purchase Request/Funding</b>		
1	1.1.1	Is the funding aligned with bona fide need and does the funding applied to each Contract Line Item Number (CLIN) properly match the supplies or service being acquired?	<a href="#">DoD 7000.14R_Vol 3, Ch 8, para 080303</a> <a href="#">AFFARS IG 5304.7103</a>	Y N N/A
2	1.1.2	If services, is the required determination by the Agency Head or Designated Requirements Official certifying that none of the functions to be performed are inherently governmental included in the contract file? (For AFMC, this is accomplished by a Requirements Approval Document.)	<a href="#">FAR 7.503(e)</a> <a href="#">DFARS 207.5</a>	Y N N/A
1	1.1.3	Does the file contain documentation of the commitment of sufficient funds prior to contract award?	<a href="#">FAR 32.702</a> <a href="#">DFARS 232.703</a> <a href="#">AFFARS MP5332.7</a> <a href="#">FAR 43.105</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>1.2</b>	<b>Acquisition Planning</b>		
2	1.2.1	If above the simplified acquisition threshold (SAT), and no exceptions apply, was an Acquisition Plan (AP), Life Cycle Management Plan (LCMP), or Streamlined Acquisition Strategy Summary (SASS) approved at the appropriate level and included in the contract file?	<a href="#">FAR 7.103</a> <a href="#">DFARS 207.103</a> <a href="#">AFFARS 5307.1</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.2.1.1	If a cost-reimbursement contract, was the written acquisition plan approved/signed at least one level above the contracting officer? (Added 1 Jul 2013)	<a href="#">FAR 16.301-3(a)(2)</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.2.2	If required, is an Acquisition Strategy Panel (ASP) or waiver by the ASP chairperson documented in the contract file?	<a href="#">AFFARS 5307.104-90</a>	Y N N/A
2	1.2.3	If a significant change occurred after the acquisition strategy was approved/signed, was the change approved by the appropriate authority?	<a href="#">FAR 7.104(a)</a> <a href="#">AFFARS 5307.104(S-90)(b)</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.2.4	If purchasing requirements relating to energy conservation, recovered materials, or environmentally preferable and energy efficient products or services apply to this acquisition, are these requirements met? (Green Procurement)	<a href="#">FAR 7.105(b)(17)</a> <a href="#">FAR 13.201(f)</a> <a href="#">FAR 23.4</a> <a href="#">FAR 23.7</a>	Y N N/A
2	1.2.5	If severable services with performance crossing fiscal years, is the period of performance less than 1 year?	<a href="#">FAR 32.703-3</a> <a href="#">DFARS 232.703-3(b)</a> <a href="#">FAR 37.106</a>	Y N N/A
2	1.2.6	If services above the SAT, is the acquisition performance based IAW AFI 63-101 Chapter 4, or approved to be otherwise by the Services Designated Official (SDO)?	<a href="#">FAR 37.6</a> <a href="#">AFFARS 5337.170-2</a> <a href="#">AFI 63-101</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.2.7	Does acquisition planning documentation reflect a strategy to transition from cost-reimbursement to firm-fixed price? (Added 1 Jul 2013)	<a href="#">FAR 7.105(b)(5)(iv)</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>1.3</b>	<b>Source List/Market Research</b>		
3	1.3.1	If consolidation, bundling, or tiered evaluations: Was appropriate market research conducted and have required coordinations, notifications, and determinations been accomplished?	<a href="#">FAR 7.107</a> <a href="#">FAR 10.001</a> <a href="#">DFARS 207.170-3</a> <a href="#">DFARS 210.001</a>	Y N N/A

### Air Force Contracting Compliance Inspection Checklist

TIER	ITEM #	ITEM	REFERENCE	RESULT (Yes, No, N/A)
3	1.3.2	If supplies or services are on the AbilityOne Procurement List or the Federal Prison Industries Schedule, did acquisition comply with Government source priorities/requirements?	<a href="#">FAR 8.002</a> <a href="#">FAR 8.602</a> <a href="#">FAR 8.704</a> <a href="#">DFARS 208.602-70</a>	Y N N/A
2	1.3.3	Was market research conducted and appropriately documented in the file?	<a href="#">FAR 10.002</a> <a href="#">FAR 12.101(a)</a> <a href="#">FAR 12.202(a)</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>1.4</b>	<b>Small Business Coordination</b>		
2	1.4.1	For acquisitions >\$10,000, including awards against Federal Supply Schedules, and unless excepted, is there a signed DD Form 2579, Small Business Coordination Record in the file?	<a href="#">DFARS 219.201(d)(10)</a> <a href="#">AFFARS 5319.201(d)(10)(B)</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.4.2	For acquisitions >\$3,000 but not >\$150,000*, was the acquisition set aside for small business unless the Contracting Officer (CO) made a determination there was no reasonable expectation of obtaining at least two small business offers? (*Thresholds are higher for some requirements – see References)	<a href="#">FAR 19.502-2(a)</a> <a href="#">DFARS 219.502-2</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>1.5</b>	<b>Synopsis of Proposed Contract Action</b>		
2	1.5.1	Was synopsis of proposed contract action accomplished as required, and if not, was an exception documented in the contract file?	<a href="#">FAR 5.101(a)</a> <a href="#">FAR 5.2</a> <a href="#">DFARS 205.205-70 – (bundling)</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>1.6</b>	<b>Other Than Full and Open Competition Authority</b>		
2	1.6.1	If “Other than Full and Open Competition”, does the contract file include a Justification and Approval (J&A) which was approved at the appropriate level?	<a href="#">FAR 6.3</a> <a href="#">DFARS 206.304</a> <a href="#">AFFARS 5306.304</a> <a href="#">FAR 8.405-6</a> <a href="#">FAR 11.105(a)</a> <a href="#">AFPD 63-3 para 4.2</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.6.2	Was the J&A, limited sources justification, or justification for an exception to fair opportunity posted as required?	<a href="#">FAR 5.301(d)</a> <a href="#">FAR 6.305</a> <a href="#">FAR 8.405-6(a)</a> <a href="#">FAR 5.406</a> <a href="#">FAR 16.505</a>	Y N N/A
2	1.6.3	If after J&A approval, an increase to scope occurred, was the increase approved by the appropriate approving official (if required)?	<a href="#">AFFARS MP5306.304</a> <a href="#">AFFARS IG5306</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>1.7</b>	<b>Determinations/Approvals</b>		
	1.7.1	Were applicable approvals or Determinations and Findings (D&F's) approved at the appropriate level and included in the contract file? Examples include the following:	Specific to each approval/D&F	Y N N/A
3	1.7.1.1	- Bundling Justification/Determination	<a href="#">FAR 7.107</a>	Y N N/A
1	1.7.1.2	- Award to Contractor on EPLS	<a href="#">FAR 9.405(d)</a> <a href="#">DFARS 209.405</a>	Y N N/A
2	1.7.1.3	- Organizational Conflict of Interest	<a href="#">FAR 9.5</a>	Y N N/A
2	1.7.1.4	- Liquidated Damages	<a href="#">FAR 11.501</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.7.1.5	- Commercial Item Determination (>\$1M)	<a href="#">DFARS 212.102</a>	Y N N/A



### Air Force Contracting Compliance Inspection Checklist

TIER	ITEM #	ITEM	REFERENCE	RESULT (Yes, No, N/A)
3	1.7.1.6	- Type of Contract	<a href="#">FAR 16.103(d)</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.7.1.7	- Indefinite-Quantity Multiple or Single Award	<a href="#">FAR 16.504(c)(1)(ii)(C)</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.7.1.8	- Single Source Task or Delivery Order or Requirements Contract >\$103M,	<a href="#">FAR 16.503(b)(2)</a> <a href="#">FAR 16.504(c)(1)(ii)(D)</a>	Y N N/A
2	1.7.1.9	- Time and Materials / Labor Hour Contract	<a href="#">FAR 16.601(d)</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.7.1.10	- Multi-Year	<a href="#">FAR 17.105-1</a>	Y N N/A
2	1.7.1.11	- Options – Quantity	<a href="#">FAR 17.205</a>	Y N N/A
2	1.7.1.12	- Options – Exercise	<a href="#">FAR 17.207</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.7.1.13	- Berry Amendment DNAD	<a href="#">DFARS 225.7002-2(b)</a>	Y N N/A
2	1.7.1.14	- Personal or Professional Services Contracts	<a href="#">FAR 37.103</a> <a href="#">DFARS 237.104(b)(i)</a>	Y N N/A
2	1.7.1.15	- Availability of Personnel – A&AS	<a href="#">FAR 37.204</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.7.1.16	- Warranties	<a href="#">DFARS 246.704</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.7.1.17	- Other Determinations/Approvals		Y N N/A
	<b>1.8</b>	<b>Solicitation/Contractual Document</b>		
2	1.8.1	Does the CLIN Structure meet the criteria for establishing the Contract Line Items and are payment instructions included as required?	<a href="#">DFARS 204.7103-1</a> <a href="#">DFARS PGI 204.71</a>	Y N N/A
	1.8.2	Are required provisions, clauses, and instructions included? Examples of situations which may require specific clauses include but are not limited to:	Specific to requirement	Y N N/A
1	1.8.2.1	- Access to classified information	<a href="#">FAR 4.404</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.8.2.2	- Brand name or Equal	<a href="#">FAR 11.107</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.8.2.3	- Unique Identification (UID)	<a href="#">DFARS 211.274</a>	Y N N/A
2	1.8.2.4	- Evaluation and Establish Option (s)	<a href="#">FAR 17.206</a> <a href="#">FAR 17.208</a>	Y N N/A
2	1.8.2.5	- Unfixed Contract Action	<a href="#">DFARS 217.7406</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.8.2.6	- Services subject to Service Contract Act	<a href="#">FAR 22.1006</a>	Y N N/A
1	1.8.2.7	- Conditioned on availability of funds	<a href="#">FAR 32.705-1</a>	Y N N/A
1	1.8.2.8	- Incrementally funded	<a href="#">FAR 32.705-2(b)</a> <a href="#">DFARS 232.705-70</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.8.2.9	- Government Furnished Property	<a href="#">FAR 45.107</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.8.2.10	- Construction Warranty	<a href="#">FAR 46.710(e)</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.8.3	If construction (Davis-Bacon) or services subject to Service Contract Act, were wage determinations or wage increases	<a href="#">FAR 22.404</a> <a href="#">FAR 22.1007</a>	Y N N/A

### Air Force Contracting Compliance Inspection Checklist

TIER	ITEM #	ITEM	REFERENCE	RESULT (Yes, No, N/A)
		incorporated and applied properly?	<a href="#">FAR 22.1012-1</a>	
3	1.8.4	When acquiring commercial items, were commercial acquisition provisions and clauses used as required?	<a href="#">FAR 12.301</a> <a href="#">FAR 12.302</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.8.5	If a sole source acquisition and expected to exceed the TINA threshold, did the CO specify in the solicitation that cost or pricing data are required. If cost or pricing data was not available, did the CO request other data and rely on this information?	<a href="#">FAR 15.403-5</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.8.6	If the contract is subject to Cost Accounting Standards, did the Contracting Officer incorporate DFARS 252.242-7005, Contractor Business Systems?	<a href="#">DFARS 242.7001</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>1.9</b>	<b>Proposal/Representations &amp; Certifications</b>		
3	1.9.1	Were late bids/offers handled properly and were late bidders/offers properly notified that their bids/offers will not be considered?	<a href="#">FAR 14.304</a> <a href="#">FAR 15.208</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.9.2	Does the Contractor's Bid/Proposal contain unresolved issues or contingencies?	<a href="#">FAR 14.404-2</a> <a href="#">FAR 14.405</a> <a href="#">FAR 15.306</a>	Y N N/A
2	1.9.3	Does the file contain documentation that the required Representations and Certifications were completed/obtained?	<a href="#">FAR 4.1201</a> <a href="#">FAR 12.301(b)(2)</a> <a href="#">FAR 15.204-5(a)</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>1.10</b>	<b>Subcontracting Plan</b>		
3	1.10.1	If >650K, and a subcontracting plan is required, has a subcontracting plan meeting the requirements of FAR 19.704 been properly coordinated, approved, distributed and incorporated in the contract? If the small disadvantaged business goal is <5%, was the subcontracting goal approved at one level above the CO?	<a href="#">FAR 19.702</a> <a href="#">FAR 19.704</a> <a href="#">FAR 19.705</a> <a href="#">DFARS 219.705-4(d)</a> <a href="#">AFFARS 5319.705-4</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.10.2	If >\$650K and no subcontracting possibilities exist, has the CO made a determination coordinated with the small business specialist and approved one level above the CO?	<a href="#">FAR 19.705-2(e)</a> <a href="#">AFFARS 5319.705-2</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.10.3	Does the file include documentation that the government is receiving subcontracting reports (ISRs and SSRs) as required by the subcontracting plan?	<a href="#">FAR 19.704</a> <a href="#">FAR 19.705-6</a> <a href="#">FAR 19.706</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>1.11</b>	<b>Contractor Responsibility</b>		
1	1.11.1	Does the file include documentation supporting a determination of responsibility or nonresponsibility, including queries of all required systems (e.g., CCR (if no exception applies), EPLS (all awards), and FAPIIS (if >SAT)?	<a href="#">FAR 4.1102</a> - (CCR) <a href="#">FAR 9.103</a> <a href="#">FAR 9.104-1</a> <a href="#">FAR 9.104-6</a> - (FAPIIS) <a href="#">FAR 9.105-2</a> <a href="#">FAR 9.404(c)(7)</a> - (EPLS)	Y N N/A
1	1.11.2	If a determination of nonresponsibility was prepared, was it reported (uploaded) to FAPIIS? (Added 1 Jul 2013)	<a href="#">FAR 9.105-2(b)(2)</a> <a href="#">FAR 42.1503(f)</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>1.12</b>	<b>Unfinalized Contract Action &amp; Unpriced Change Order</b>		
2	1.12.1	Is the Unfinalized Contract Action (UCA) approval document signed at the appropriate level, and does it fully explain the need to begin performance before finalization, including the adverse	<a href="#">DFARS 217.7404-1</a> <a href="#">AFFARS 5317.7404-1</a> <a href="#">AFFARS 5317.7405</a>	Y N N/A

### Air Force Contracting Compliance Inspection Checklist

TIER	ITEM #	ITEM	REFERENCE	RESULT (Yes, No, N/A)
		impact on agency requirements resulting from delays in beginning performance?	<a href="#">AFFARS MP5317.74</a>	
3	1.12.2	If definitization was not accomplished within 180 days, does the contract file include justification to include a revised definitization milestone schedule?	<a href="#">DFARS 217.7404-3</a> <a href="#">AFFARS MP5317.74(3)</a> <a href="#">AFFARS MP5343.204-70-3 (S-91)(b)</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.12.3	Does the Price Negotiation Memorandum for definitization document the basis for the profit or fee negotiated when a substantial portion of the required performance has been completed?	<a href="#">DFARS 217.7404-6</a> <a href="#">AFFARS MP5317.74(4)</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>1.13</b>	<b>Government Property</b>		
3	1.13.1	Prior to furnishing Government property to the contractor, did the CO verify availability and ensure requirements of FAR 45.102 were addressed?	<a href="#">FAR 45.102</a> <a href="#">DFARS PGI 245.103-70</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.13.2	If Government Property was furnished, did the CO include a list in the solicitation? If a competitive acquisition, did the solicitation address contractor responsibilities and evaluation procedures?	<a href="#">FAR 45.201</a> <a href="#">FAR 45.202</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.13.3	If there will be Contractor Acquired Property under a Cost type or Time and Materials contract, has a CLIN for delivery of the property been established?	<a href="#">FAR 45.402</a> <a href="#">DFARS PGI 245.402-70(2)</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>1.14</b>	<b>Cost/Pricing</b>		
2	1.14.1	Did the CO adequately document the principal elements of the negotiated agreement (e.g., in a Price Negotiation Memorandum) as required by FAR 15.406-3(a), with a statement that the price is fair and reasonable, signed by the CO? Did the CO document the extent certified cost or pricing data was relied upon and used in negotiations, if applicable?	<a href="#">FAR 15.406-3</a> <a href="#">FAR 15.406-3(a)(6)</a> <a href="#">DFARS PGI 215.406-3</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.14.2	If using commercial or simplified acquisition procedures, does the contract file document specific steps taken to ensure a fair and reasonable price was determined for the acquisition?	<a href="#">FAR 12.209</a> <a href="#">FAR 13.106-3</a> <a href="#">FAR 15.403-1(c)(3)</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.14.3	When certified cost or pricing data is required and none of the exceptions of FAR 15.403-1(b) apply, did the CO obtain a properly executed Certificate of Current Cost or Pricing Data?	<a href="#">FAR 15.403-4</a> <a href="#">FAR 15.403-1(b)</a> <a href="#">FAR 15.406-2</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.14.4	Did the CO include the Air Force Proposal Adequacy Checklist (AFPAC) in draft and final RFPs and RFPs for UCAs, when required?	<a href="#">AFFARS MP5315.4(3)(c)</a>	Y N N/A
2	1.14.5	If certified cost or pricing data was not required and acquisition exceeds the TINA threshold, did the CO obtain and utilize data other than certified cost or pricing data as necessary (e.g., price analysis and/or cost analysis) to establish a fair and reasonable price?	<a href="#">FAR 15.402</a> <a href="#">FAR 15.403-3</a> <a href="#">FAR 15.404-1</a> <a href="#">FAR 15.406-3(a)(5)</a> <a href="#">DFARS PGI 215.403-3</a> <a href="#">DFARS PGI 215.404-1</a>	Y N N/A
2	1.14.6	If certified cost or pricing data was not required and acquisition exceeds the TINA threshold, did the CO document the exception used and the basis for not requiring certified cost or pricing data?	<a href="#">FAR 15.403-1</a> <a href="#">FAR 15.403-2</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.14.7	If a competitive acquisition, is the CO's determination of adequate price competition documented (e.g., in a Price Competition	<a href="#">FAR 15.403-1(c)(1)</a> <a href="#">DFARS 215.403-1(c)(1)</a>	Y N N/A

### Air Force Contracting Compliance Inspection Checklist

TIER	ITEM #	ITEM	REFERENCE	RESULT (Yes, No, N/A)
		Memorandum)?		
	<b>1.15</b>	<b>Security Requirements</b>		
1	1.15.1	If access to classified information is required, does the file contain a DD Form 254, Contract Security Classification Specification, in proper format and reviewed by appropriate security office personnel? Is Block 16 on the form signed by the CO or authorized CO rep?	<a href="#">FAR 4.403(c)</a> <a href="#">AFI 31-601, Chapter 4</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>1.16</b>	<b>Source Selection</b>		
3	1.16.1	Does the source selection or contract file contain a properly completed Source Selection Plan and Source Selection Decision Document? Were these documents approved at the appropriate level?	<a href="#">DoD Source Selection Procedures, Chapter 4</a> <a href="#">AFFARS MP5315.3, Chapter 4</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.16.2	Were all factors and significant subfactors for contract award and their relative importance stated clearly in the solicitation?	<a href="#">FAR 15.304</a> <a href="#">AFFARS MP5315.3, Chapter 4</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.16.3	During source selections, after information was presented to the SSA, were updates, revisions, or changes to the evaluation information captured in subsequent documentation such that the original record remained distinct?	<a href="#">AFFARS MP5315.3 para 1.4.2.2.4</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.16.4	If required, was past performance data evaluated and documented properly?	<a href="#">FAR 15.304</a> <a href="#">AFFARS MP5315.3, Chapter 4</a>	Y N N/A
2	1.16.5	Was the Source Selection Decision consistent with the solicitation's evaluation factors and subfactors?	<a href="#">FAR 13.106-2(a)(2)</a> <a href="#">FAR 15.305(a)</a> <a href="#">FAR 15.308</a>	Y N N/A
2	1.16.6	Were unsuccessful offerors given timely notification and debriefings?	<a href="#">FAR 15.503</a> <a href="#">FAR 15.505</a> <a href="#">FAR 15.506</a>	Y N N/A
2	1.16.7	Has Source Selection Training been accomplished as required?	<a href="#">MP5315.3, Chapter 6, Para 6.4.1</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>1.17</b>	<b>Legal Review</b>		
2	1.17.1	Has legal review been obtained and documented when required, and have legal comments been satisfactorily resolved?	<a href="#">AFFARS 5301.602-2(c)(i)</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>1.18</b>	<b>Technical Review</b>		
2	1.18.1	Does the contract file include a detailed technical analysis from the requesting activity when required?	<a href="#">FAR 15.404-1(e)</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>1.19</b>	<b>Clearance Review &amp; Approval</b>		
2	1.19.1	Was the Clearance Process followed, and Clearance Approval(s) obtained, as required?	<a href="#">DFARS PGI 201.170-4(f)</a> <a href="#">AFFARS 5301.90</a> <a href="#">AFFARS MP5301.9001(b)</a>	Y N N/A

### Air Force Contracting Compliance Inspection Checklist

TIER	ITEM #	ITEM	REFERENCE	RESULT (Yes, No, N/A)
1	1.19.2	Was the CO who executed the contract fully authorized to do so within warrant limitations?	<a href="#">FAR 1.602</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>1.20</b>	<b>Distribution</b>		
3	1.20.1	Was submission of a Contract Action Report (CAR) timely and accurate?	<a href="#">FAR 4.604</a> <a href="#">DFARS 204.6</a>	Y N N/A
2	1.20.2	Immediately subsequent to a contract action, did the CO print and sign the CAR and place in the contract file? (Added 3 Sep 13)	<a href="#">FAR 4.604</a> <a href="#">DFARS 204.6</a> <a href="#">AFFARS 5304.604 (2)</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.20.3	If >\$6.5M, was announcement of contract award executed via 1279 Report as required?	<a href="#">DFARS 205.303</a> <a href="#">AFFARS 5305.303</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>1.21</b>	<b>Protests Before/After Award</b>		
2	1.21.1	Did the CO follow proper procedures to resolve protests?	<a href="#">FAR 33.1</a> <a href="#">DFARS 233.170</a> <a href="#">AFFARS 5333.1</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>1.22</b>	<b>Quality Assurance</b>		
3	1.22.1	If services exceeded the SAT, did the CO make a decision that a COR is required and that adequate resources are available to monitor the contract? (Updated 1 Jul 13)	<a href="#">FAR 1.602-2(d)</a> <a href="#">DFARS 201.602-2</a> <a href="#">DFARS PGI 201.602-2</a> <a href="#">AFFARS MP5301.602-2(d)</a> <a href="#">FAR 16.301-3(a)(4)</a>	Y N N/A
2	1.22.2	Did the COR meet the minimum training requirements for COR designation, including contract specific training, prior to contract award?	<a href="#">AFFARS MP5301.602-2(d)(1.4) and (4.1)</a>	Y N N/A
2	1.22.3	Did the CO ensure a quality assurance surveillance plan (QASP) was addressed and documented in the contract file for each contract except for those awarded using simplified acquisition procedures?	<a href="#">FAR 46.103</a> <a href="#">DFARS 246.401</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>1.23</b>	<b>Contract Administration</b>		
3	1.23.1	If a modification was done, is the appropriate authority cited?	<a href="#">FAR 43.301 &amp; FAR 53.243</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.23.2	Were changes in the terms and conditions of a contract for commercial items made by written agreement of the parties?	<a href="#">FAR 52.212-4(c)</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.23.3	If an option was exercised, did the CO provide written notice to the contractor within the specified time period and in accordance with the terms of the contract?	<a href="#">FAR 17.207</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.23.4	Are award fee procedures properly documented and followed in accordance with the award fee plan?	<a href="#">FAR 16.401(c)</a> <a href="#">DFARS 216.401</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.23.5	If contract performance requires work on a Government installation, did the contractor notify the CO in writing that the required insurance had been obtained?	<a href="#">FAR 28.301</a> <a href="#">FAR 52.228-5</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.23.6	Did the CO extend the contract per the extension of Services Clause and not more than 6 months?	<a href="#">FAR 17.208(f)</a> <a href="#">FAR 37.111</a>	Y N N/A



### Air Force Contracting Compliance Inspection Checklist

TIER	ITEM #	ITEM	REFERENCE	RESULT (Yes, No, N/A)
3	1.23.7	If termination, were cure and show cause and other related notices issued timely and properly?	<a href="#">FAR 49.402-3</a> <a href="#">FAR 49.607</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.23.8	If termination, were the procedures for termination for convenience, termination for default, and termination for cause followed, including reporting default and cause actions to FAPIIS? (Updated 1 Jul 13)	<a href="#">FAR 9.104-6(d)</a> <a href="#">DFARS 209.105-2-70</a> <a href="#">FAR 49</a> <a href="#">AFFARS 5333.291(b)</a> <a href="#">AFFARS 5349</a> <a href="#">FAR 12.403</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.23.9	Was the contractor's accounting system adequate during the period of performance? (Added 1 Jul 13)	<a href="#">FAR 42.302(a)(12)</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.23.10	Were rerepresentation and novation modifications accomplished and reported to FPDS? (Added 1 Jul 13)	<a href="#">FAR 19.301</a> <a href="#">DFARS 219.3</a> <a href="#">FAR 42.12</a> <a href="#">DFARS 242.12</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>1.24</b>	<b>Other Contract Actions</b>		
3	1.24.1	Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA): Did the CO furnish the BPA supplier with a list of individuals authorized to place orders either by name, title, or position, along with his/her organization and the dollar limitation for each order?	<a href="#">FAR 13.303-3(a)(4)</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.24.2	BPA: Did the CO review the BPA at least annually to ensure authorized procedures are followed?	<a href="#">FAR 13.303-6</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.24.3	Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) Order: Were at least three schedule contractors considered prior to placing an order in excess of the micro-purchase threshold?	<a href="#">FAR 8.405-1(c)</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.24.4	FSS Order: Was an order exceeding the Simplified Acquisition Threshold placed against a FSS awarded on a competitive basis? If not, was the contract file documented appropriately?	<a href="#">DFARS 208.405-70</a> <a href="#">FAR 8.405-6</a>	Y N N/A
		<b>Research &amp; Development</b>		
	<b>1.25</b>	<b>Assistance Instrument</b>		
3	1.25.1	Before using a grant or cooperative agreement, did the Grants Officer make a positive judgment that an assistance instrument, rather than a procurement contract, was the appropriate instrument?	<a href="#">DoD Grant and Agreement Regulations</a> , <a href="#">DoD 3210.6</a> <a href="#">(DoDGARS) 22.205</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.25.2	When a Grants Officer determined that a cooperative agreement was the appropriate instrument, did the Grants Officer document the nature of the substantial involvement that led to selection of a cooperative agreement?	<a href="#">DoDGARS 22.215(a)(2)</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.25.3	Did the Grants Officer use merit-based, competitive procedures to award grants and cooperative agreements: (1) In every case where required by statute (e.g., for certain grants to institutions of higher education) and (2) To the maximum extent practicable in all cases where not required by statute?	<a href="#">DoDGARS 22.305(b)</a>	Y N N/A
2	1.25.4	Was notice of funding availability or Broad Agency Announcement publicly disseminated via posting at the Governmentwide site designated by the OMB (currently <a href="http://www.Grants.gov">http://www.Grants.gov</a> )?	<a href="#">DoDGARS 22.315(a)(3)</a>	Y N N/A

### Air Force Contracting Compliance Inspection Checklist

TIER	ITEM #	ITEM	REFERENCE	RESULT (Yes, No, N/A)
3	1.25.5	Are Technology Investments Agreement awarded only by Agreements Officers?	<a href="#">DoDGARS 37.125</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>1.26</b>	<b>Broad Agency Announcement (BAA)</b>		
3	1.26.1	Does the BAA, together with any supporting documents, (1) Describe the agency's research interest; (2) Describe the criteria for selecting the proposals, their relative importance, and the method of evaluation; (3) Specify the period of time during which proposals submitted in response to the BAA will be accepted; and (4) Contain instructions for the preparation and submission of proposals?	<a href="#">FAR 35.016(b)</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.26.2	Was the availability of the BAA publicized through the Governmentwide point of entry (GPE), and published no less frequently than annually?	<a href="#">FAR 35.016(c)</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.26.3	Were proposals received as a result of the BAA evaluated in accordance with evaluation criteria through a peer or scientific review process?	<a href="#">FAR 35.016(d)</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.26.4	For the BAA, was technical, importance to agency programs, and fund availability the primary basis for selecting proposals for acceptance? Was cost realism and reasonableness also considered to the extent appropriate?	<a href="#">FAR 35.016(e)</a>	Y N N/A
		<b>Operational -- Construction / Architect-Engineer</b>		
	<b>1.27</b>	<b>Construction</b>		
3	1.27.1	Were payment and performance bond requirements included in the solicitation and was adequate security obtained? If not, was documentation present IAW FAR 28.102-1?	<a href="#">FAR 28.102</a> <a href="#">FAR 28.201</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.27.2	If the solicitation contains one or more items subject to statutory cost limitations, were offerors informed as to the applicability of cost limitations for each affected item in a separate schedule?	<a href="#">FAR 36.205 (b)</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.27.3	Was an independent Government estimate of construction costs prepared and did the solicitation contain the magnitude of the requirement?	<a href="#">FAR 36.203</a> <a href="#">FAR 36.204</a> <a href="#">DFARS 236.204</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.27.4	Are liquidated damages included on projects estimated at over \$650K, except cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts? If so, did the file contain documentation for how liquidated damages were determined?	<a href="#">FAR 11.502</a> <a href="#">FAR 36.206</a> <a href="#">DFARS 211.503</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.27.5	Did the CO make appropriate arrangements for prospective offerors to inspect the work site and document the visit?	<a href="#">FAR 36.210</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.27.6	Was final inspection and acceptance of the construction made by the Government?	<a href="#">FAR 46.312</a> <a href="#">FAR 52.246-12</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.27.7	Was a release of claims and all other final documentation obtained from the contractor and civil engineer prior to final payment?	<a href="#">FAR 32.111(a)(5)</a> <a href="#">FAR 52.232-5(h)</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>1.28</b>	<b>Architect-Engineer (A&amp;E) Services</b>		
2	1.28.1	Is the 6% statutory limitation for A&E design services observed?	<a href="#">FAR 15.404-4(c)(4)(i)(B)</a>	Y N N/A

### Air Force Contracting Compliance Inspection Checklist

TIER	ITEM #	ITEM	REFERENCE	RESULT (Yes, No, N/A)
3	1.28.2	Was approval from the head of the agency received for any construction contract awarded to a firm (or its subsidiaries or affiliates) that designed the project?	<a href="#">FAR 36.209</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.28.3	Did the evaluation board prepare a selection report and recommend, in order of preference, at least three firms that were considered to be the most highly qualified?	<a href="#">FAR 36.602-3</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.28.4	Was an independent government estimate of the cost of A&E services submitted to the CO before commencing negotiations for each action expected to exceed the SAT?	<a href="#">FAR 36.605</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>1.29</b>	<b>Ratifications</b>		
3	1.29.1	Are ratifications processed IAW AFFARS MP5301.602-3?	<a href="#">AFFARS 5301.602-3</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>1.30</b>	<b>Compliance with DoD's Only One Offer Policy</b> (Added 16 Apr 2013)		
3	1.30.1	If only one offer was received when competitive procedures were used and the solicitation allowed fewer than 30 days for receipt of proposals, does the contract file reflect:  (a) That the contracting officer consulted with the requiring activity regarding revision of the requirements document in order to promote more competition (see FAR 6.502(b) and 11.002); and  (b) That the contracting officer resolicited for an additional period of at least 30 days for receipt of proposals; or obtained HCA approval to waive the requirement to resolicit for an additional period of at least 30 days?	<a href="#">DFARS 215.371-2</a> <a href="#">DFARS 215.371-5(a)</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.30.2	If there was "reasonable expectation ... that two or more offerors, competing independently, would submit priced offers" but only one offer was received, does the contract file contain a properly approved determination that the price is fair and reasonable (see FAR 15.403-1(c)(1)(ii))?	<a href="#">DFARS 215.371-3(a)</a>	Y N N/A
3	1.30.3	Did the contracting officer obtain offeror cost or pricing data necessary to determine a fair and reasonable price, or comply with the requirement for certified cost or pricing data, and enter into negotiations with the offeror to establish a fair and reasonable price?	<a href="#">DFARS 215.371-3(b)</a>	Y N N/A
		<b>Contracting Office</b>		
		<b>General Management</b>		
	<b>2.1</b>	<b>Self-Inspection Program</b>		
3	2.1.1	Does the contracting office have a documented self-inspection program, which includes a process for resolving findings, reviews to close findings, and integrating findings into a unit training program?	<a href="#">AFFARS MP5301.601-91</a> <a href="#">AFI 64-102 para 3.4.9 - (Operational)</a> <a href="#">AFI 90-201 para 2.4</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>2.2</b>	<b>Contracting Officer Appointments/Warrants</b>		
3	2.2.1	Are the selection, appointment, termination, and record maintenance of contracting officer warrants, including contingency warrants, accomplished properly?	<a href="#">FAR 1.603</a> <a href="#">AFFARS 5301.603</a> <a href="#">AFFARS MP5301.603</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>2.3</b>	<b>Customer Education</b>		



### Air Force Contracting Compliance Inspection Checklist

TIER	ITEM #	ITEM	REFERENCE	RESULT (Yes, No, N/A)
3	2.3.1	Has the contracting office established and maintained a customer education program to explain contracting procedures, help with developing requisitions for requirements, develop and maintain "open" lines of communication, and stress the importance of meaningful partnerships with customers and contractors?	<a href="#">AFI 64-102 para 3.4.3 &amp; 3.4.8</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>2.4</b>	<b>Training Programs</b>		
3	2.4.1	Is a formal training program established and implemented for civilians, military, interns, and Copper Caps?	<a href="#">AFI 36-401 para 1.10.8</a> <a href="#">AFI 36-602 para 3.8 - (Copper Caps)</a> <a href="#">AFI 64-102 para 3.4.5 - (Operational)</a>	Y N N/A
3	2.4.2	Has the contracting office established an On-The-Job-Training (OJT) program which allows personnel to attain knowledge and skill qualifications required to perform duty in their specialty?	<a href="#">AFI 36-2201 para 6.1</a> <a href="#">AFI 64-102 para 3.6.2, 3.9.7, 3.9.8</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>2.5</b>	<b>Continuous Learning</b>		
3	2.5.1	Are all acquisition coded contracting personnel afforded continuous learning opportunities, and are the required employees achieving the mandatory 80 continuous learning points (CLP) within two years?	<a href="#">DODI 5000.66 para E2.2.8.1</a> <a href="#">AFI 36-401 para 5.7</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>2.6</b>	<b>Contingency Support</b>		
2	2.6.1	Does the contracting office develop and maintain Contracting Incident Response Kits (CIRKs) and deployment kits for use during contingencies, as required?	<a href="#">AFFARS Appendix CC-302</a> <a href="#">AFFARS MPCC-301(c)(1)</a>	Y N N/A
2	2.6.2	Does the contracting unit commander ensure mandatory contingency specific training is accomplished and documented? (Including contracting activity training of non-contracting personnel designated to support contingency plans on the proper use of ordering instruments, SF 44, GPC, and other decentralized procedures authorized for use)	<a href="#">AFI 64-102 para 3.7.1</a>	Y N N/A
2	2.6.3	Are the Unit Type Codes (UTCs) status being monitored and reported in ART? Is a mobility roster being maintained for all tasked UTCs?	<a href="#">AFI 64-102 para 3.6.9 and 3.7.4</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>2.7</b>	<b>Contract Closeout and Disposal of Contract Files</b>		
3	2.7.1	For contracts administered by the contracting office, are contract closeouts accomplished?	<a href="#">FAR 4.804</a> <a href="#">DFARS PGI 204.8</a>	Y N N/A
3	2.7.2	Does the contracting office follow the prescribed procedures for the handling, storing, and disposing of contract files?	<a href="#">FAR 4.805</a> <a href="#">DFARS 204.805</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>2.8</b>	<b>Interagency Acquisitions</b>		
3	2.8.1	Are required contracting office responsibilities completed for Military Interdepartmental Purchase Requests (MIPRs) that will result in a contract action?	<a href="#">AFI 65-116 para 3.5</a>	Y N N/A
		<b>Other Required Evaluations</b>		
	<b>2.9</b>	<b>Government Purchase Card (GPC) Program</b>		
3	2.9.1	Has the Contracting Squadron Commander/Chief of Contracting Office designated a primary and at least one alternate Agency/	<a href="#">AFI 64-117 paras 2.3.2.1 and 2.3.3.1</a>	Y N N/A

### Air Force Contracting Compliance Inspection Checklist

TIER	ITEM #	ITEM	REFERENCE	RESULT (Yes, No, N/A)
		Organization Program Coordinator (A/OPC) to manage the installation level GPC Program? Also, are the primary and alternate A/OPCs in an allowable job series and APDP Level I certified in Contracting?		
3	2.9.2	Is the GPC program managed with effective internal controls to ensure the appropriate management, operation, and oversight of the local GPC program?	<a href="#">AFI 64-117</a>	Y N N/A
3	2.9.3	Do all card holders not in contracting organizations possess written authority from the Contracting Squadron Commander/Chief of Contracting Office to make purchases and/or place orders?	<a href="#">AFI 64-117 para 2.3.2.2</a>	Y N N/A
3	2.9.4	Is the A/OPC performing and documenting physical surveillance on each managing account, as well as a random sample of 25% of cardholders assigned to each managing account to include corrective actions taken?	<a href="#">AFI 64-117 para 5.1.2.1</a>	Y N N/A
3	2.9.5	Is the A/OPC using the Purchase Card On-Line System (PCOLS) as an electronic tool to manage its GPC Program to perform Level IV reviews?	<a href="#">AFI 64-117 para 5.1.2.6</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>2.10</b>	<b>Oversight of QA Program</b>		
3	2.10.1	Has a Quality Assurance Program Coordinator (QAPC) been appointed and trained, and is the QAPC performing the roles and responsibilities outlined in AFFARS MP5346.103?	<a href="#">AFFARS MP5346.103</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>2.11</b>	<b>Plans for Continuation of Contractor Services</b>		
3	2.11.1	For contracts which include Government-determined essential contractor services, do the contracts contain a written mission essential contractor services plan? Do COs consult with a functional manager to assess the sufficiency of a plan prior to incorporation in the contract?	<a href="#">DFARS 237.7602</a>	Y N N/A
	<b>2.12</b>	<b>Nonappropriated Fund (NAF) Contracting Procedures</b>		
3	2.12.1	Did the Force Support Squadron (FSS) Commander (or equivalent) review NAF Contracting Officer appointments annually and forward requests for termination to the Air Force Nonappropriated Fund Purchasing Office (AFNAFPO) when the appointment is no longer needed?	<a href="#">AFMAN 64-302 para 3.6.2</a>	Y N N/A
3	2.12.2	Did the Force Support Squadron (FSS) Commander (or equivalent) certify on an annual basis that adequate controls are in place and that Nonappropriated Fund (NAF) Contracting is being conducted in accordance with current directives, and submitted to HQ AFSVA/SVC, no later than 30 Nov each year?	<a href="#">AFMAN 64-302 para 3.12</a>	Y N N/A

**Notes:**

1. References are not all inclusive. Other guidance may be applicable to the Item.
2. Inspector General personnel may identify compliance deficiencies in addition to Items listed in the checklist.
3. If dollar thresholds listed in the checklist become incorrect due to changes in policy, the current thresholds rule.

**Tier Basis per AFI 90-201:**

### **Air Force Contracting Compliance Inspection Checklist**

**Tier 1:** Non-compliance puts Airmen, commanders, or the USAF at high risk of mission or program failure, injury, legal jeopardy or waste.

**Tier 2:** Non-compliance limits mission or program effectiveness or efficiency and adds significant risk of mission or program failure, injury, legal jeopardy or waste.

**Tier 3:** Non-compliance limits mission or program effectiveness or efficiency but does not create significant risk of mission or program failure, injury, legal jeopardy or waste.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## LIST OF REFERENCES

- Armstrong, A. (2012, February 26). *Presentation to the Base Business Initiative (BBI) test companies, partner companies, and public* [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from <http://www.howardcountymd.gov/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=6442465088>
- Balanced Scorecard Institute. (n.d.). Balanced scorecard basics. Retrieved from <http://balancedscorecard.org/Resources/About-the-Balanced-Scorecard>
- Burton, B., & Nordin, A. (2007). *Analysis of the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center contract management process*. (Master's thesis). Retrieved from Calhoun <http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/10187>
- Christesen, D. A. (2008). *The impact of balanced scorecard usage on organization performance* (Master's thesis). Retrieved from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses database. (Order No. 3302302).
- Clark, P. G. (2009). Reflecting on reflection in interprofessional education: Implications for theory and practice. *Journal of Interprofessional Care*, 23(3), 213–223.
- Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG). (2015a). *Some contracting controls at Mission and Installation Contracting Command, Fort Polk, Louisiana, need improvement* (Report No. DODIG-2015-080). Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from <http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-2015-080.pdf>
- Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG). (2015b). *Contingency contracting: A framework for reform—2015 update* (Report No. DODIG-2015-101). Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from <http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-2015-101.pdf>
- Forstner, E., Kamprath, N., & Röglinger, M. (2014). Capability development with process maturity models—Decision framework and economic analysis. *Journal of Decision Systems*, 23(2), 127–150.
- Gabbert, J. (2015). *Background information: Mission and Installation Contracting Command 2025 plan* (White paper). Unpublished manuscript.
- Gansler, J. S. (2007). *Urgent reform required: Army expeditionary contracting* (Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations). Washington, DC: Secretary of the Army. Retrieved from [http://www.acq.osd.mil/asda/docs/Commission\\_Report\\_Final\\_Report\\_10-31-07.pdf](http://www.acq.osd.mil/asda/docs/Commission_Report_Final_Report_10-31-07.pdf)
- Garrett, G. A. (2007). *World class contracting* (4th ed.). Chicago, IL: CCH.

- Garrett, G. A., & Rendon, R. G. (2005a). *Contract management organizational assessment tools*. McLean, VA: National Contract Management Association.
- Garrett, G. A., & Rendon, R. G. (2005b, September). Managing contracts in turbulent times: The contract management maturity model. *Contract Management*, 45, 48–57.
- Gary, C., & Petree, C. (2014). *Assessment of Aberdeen Proving Ground—Army Contracting Command, contract management process* (Master's thesis). Retrieved from Calhoun <http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/44644>
- Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2004, September). *Tools for measuring and managing defense agency performance could be strengthened* (GAO-04-919). Washington, DC: Author.
- Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2012, December). *DOD initiative to address audit backlog shows promise, but additional management attention needed to close aging contracts* (GAO-13-131). Washington, DC: Author.
- Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2015, February). *DOD's high risk areas: Actions needed to reduce vulnerabilities and improve business outcomes* (GAO-15-290). Washington, DC: Author.
- Graham, L., Lewis, S., & Wallace, A. (2010). *Analysis of contract management process at Naval Sea Systems Command* (Master's thesis). Retrieved from Calhoun <http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/10490>
- Harger, D. (2015). *410th contracting support brigade command brief* [PowerPoint slides]. Unpublished presentation.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA). (2015). *Army inspection policy* (AR 1–201). Washington, DC: Author.
- Jokela, T., Siponen, M., Hirasawa, N., & Earthy, J. (2006). A survey of usability capability maturity models: Implications for practice and research. *Behaviour & Information Technology*, 25(3), 263–282.  
doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01449290500168079>
- Kaplan, R. and Norton, D. (1992) “The balanced scorecard—Measures that drive performance,” *Harvard Business Review*, 21, pp. 71–9.
- Kendall, F. (2013, April 24). *Implementation directive for Better Buying Power 2.0: Achieving greater efficiency and productivity in defense spending* [Memorandum]. Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

- Kendall, F. (2015, April 09). *Implementation directive for Better Buying Power 3.0: Achieving dominant capabilities through technical excellence and innovation* [Memorandum]. Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
- Lakos, A., & Phipps, S. (2004). Creating a culture of assessment: A catalyst for organizational change. *Portal: Libraries and the Academy*, 4(3), 345–361.
- McFall, T. (2015). *918th CBN/MICC-FC organizational overview* [PowerPoint slides]. Unpublished presentation.
- Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO). (n.d.). About DCMO. Retrieved June 14, 2015, from <http://dcmo.defense.gov/about/missionandvision>
- Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO). (2014). *Organizational assessment report*. Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer. Retrieved from <http://dcmo.defense.gov/publications/documents/Organizational%20Assessment%20FY14.pdf>
- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD[AT&L]). (n.d.). Better Buying Power. Retrieved from <http://bbp.dau.mil/>
- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD[AT&L]). (2003, May 12). *The defense acquisition system* (DOD Directive 5000.1). Washington, DC: Author.
- Paulk, M. (1993). *Capability maturity model for software*. Pittsburgh, PA: John Wiley & Sons.
- Piotrowski, S. J., & Ansah, E. (2010). Organizational assessment tools: Report cards and scorecards of the federal agencies. *Public Administration Quarterly*, 34(1), 109–142.
- Rendon, R. G. (2003). *A systematic approach to assessing organizational contract management maturity* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). School of Business, Argosy University, Orange County, CA.
- Rendon, R. G. (2008). Procurement process maturity: Key to performance measurement. *Journal of Public Procurement*, 8(2), 200–214.
- Rendon, R. G. (2015a, June). *An approach to assessing contract management process maturity*. PowerPoint presentation at the Institute for Supply Management, Phoenix, AZ. Unpublished presentation.

- Rendon, R. G. (2015b). Benchmarking contract management process maturity: A case study of the U.S. Navy. *Benchmarking: An International Journal*, 22(7), 1481–1508. Retrieved from <http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1108/BIJ-10-2014-0096>
- Rendon, R. G., & Naval Postgraduate School Graduate School of Business & Public Policy (GSBPP). (2009). *Contract management process maturity: Empirical analysis of organizational assessments*. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School.
- Rendon, R. G., & Naval Postgraduate School Graduate School of Business & Public Policy (GSBPP). (2011). *Assessment of Army Contracting Command's contract management processes*. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School.
- U.S. Army. (n.d.-a). About ECC. Retrieved June 14, 2015, from <http://acc.army.mil/ecc/about/>
- U.S. Army. (n.d.-b). Command and staff. Retrieved June 14, 2015, from <http://acc.army.mil/command-and-staff/>
- U.S. Army. (n.d.-c). Office of the Inspector General. Retrieved June 14, 2015, from <http://www.daig.pentagon.mil/>
- U.S. Army. (2015a). ECC fact sheet. Retrieved from <http://acc.army.mil/files/ECC%20Fact%20Sheet%2015%20final.pdf>
- U.S. Army. (2015b). MICC fact sheet. Retrieved from <http://acc.army.mil/files/MICC%20Fact%20Sheet%2015%20final.pdf>
- U.S. Army. (2015c). ACC fact sheet. Retrieved from <http://acc.army.mil/files/ACC%20Fact%20Sheet%2015%20Final%20March.pdf>



## **INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST**

1. Defense Technical Information Center  
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, California